University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1973

The Eighth Circuit: 1971-1972
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "The Eighth Circuit: 1971-1972" (1973). Minnesota Law Review. 3036.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3036

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

1105

Note: The Eighth Circuit: 1971-1972
The Note which follows presents a collection of comments
upon decisions of the Eighth Circuit during the 1971-72 term.
Although it is intended to complement the annual Minnesota
Supreme Court Note, the selection and format differ somewhat.
Rather than attempting to present a survey of all decided cases
during the past year, we have chosen to focus primarily upon
decisions of some significance in announcing, clarifying, or modifying the law in the Eighth Circuit and to analyze those in
greater depth. We hope that the following pages will provide
a useful reference for practitioners within the Eighth Circuit as
well as for other readers.*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Anti-trust Law: Measure of Damages in Private Action Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act [Albrecht v. Herald Co., 452
F.2d 124 (1971)]
Civil Procedure: Discovery Orders Claimed to Violate AttorneyClient Privilege Reviewable by Mandamus [Pfizer, Inc. v.
Lord, 456 F.2d 545 (1972) ]
Civil Rights: Parallel Remedy for Private Discrimination in Employment Provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 [Brady v. BristolMeyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (1972)]
Civil Rights: Private Conspiracy in Deprivation of First Amendment Rights Reached by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) [Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (1971)]
Civil Rights: Seniority System Discrimination Remedied by Allowance of 50% Seniority Rights [United States v. St. LouisS.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (1972)]
Constitutional Law: Due Process Violated by Mid-Term Dismissal
of Teacher Without Notice or Hearing [Cooley v. Board of
Education, 453 F.2d 282 (1972)]
Constitutional Law: State Employees' Cause of Action Under
Fair Labor Standards Act Barred by Sovereign Immunity
[Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare v.
Department of Public Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820 (1971) ]
Criminal Law: Affirmative Moral Beliefs Legally Insufficient to
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* See also the case comment on Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 1170 (1972), 57 Mmn. L. RIv. 1243
(1973).
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Antitrust Law: Measure of Damages in Private Action
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
When plaintiff, an independent newspaper carrier, refused
to adhere to the St. Louis Globe-Democrat's suggested maximum
retail selling price, the newspaper hired a company to solicit subscribers away from him and another carrier to deliver papers to
those subscribers. The plaintiff was forced to sell his route and
subsequently brought a private treble damage action against the
newspaper.

A jury found that the defendant had not violated
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act1 and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the newspaper, the
soliciting company, and the other carrier had illegally combined
to fix prices.3 The decision broadened the concept of an "illegal
combination" under Section 1 and was widely recognized as a
major case in antitrust law. 4 The Court remanded the case for
determination of damages.
The district court submitted three separate elements of damages to the jury for consideration: (1) the amount of operating
profits lost by the plaintiff because of the Globe-Democrat's
competition prior to the sale; (2) the difference between the
actual price received and the fair market value of the plaintiff's
business at the time of sale absent the defendants' illegal interference; and (3) the loss of future profits following the forced
sale. 5 The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on all three items
in the respective amounts of $2,000, $12,000, and $57,000. The
district court reduced the award for loss of profits prior to
sale to $1,313, allowed the award of $12,000, and reduced the
award for loss of future profits to $14,768.0 Judgment was entered for treble damages totaling $82,243 plus attorney's fees.
Both parties appealed. Plaintiff argued that the jury's award of
$57,000 for loss of future profits should be reinstated. Defendant contended that the award of damages for loss of future profits duplicated damages awarded for the diminution of the market
value of the business. The Eighth Circuit agreed with defendant and reversed the district court's award for loss of future
profits, holding that the prospect of future earnings is included in computing the market value of a business. Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 452 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1971).
There are two basic methods for measuring the amount of
damages to be awarded to an antitrust plaintiff who has been
forced out of business. The diminished market value method
calculates damages based on the difference between what the
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), provides:
"Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal. ..."
2. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1966).
3. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
4. See, e.g., Note, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rlv. 208 (1968); Note,
57 CAiLF. L.REv.262 (1969); Note, 82 HARv. L.REv.254 (1968); Note, 63
Nw.U.L. REv. 862 (1969); Comment, 37 U. CiN. L. Rv.411 (1968).
5. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 321 F. Supp. 99, 101 (E.D.Mo. 1970).

6. Id.at 100-101.
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plaintiff would have received for his business "but for" the defendant's antitrust violation and the actual sale price. The "but
for" market value is, in effect, the going concern value of the
business. 7 The "loss of future profits" method calculates damages by capitalizing and discounting to present value the estimated future profits of the business. In addition to an award
based on either of these methods, a plaintiff may receive damages for loss of profits while he still owned and operated the
business. However, because one factor in computing the "but
for" market value of a business is the prospect of future profits,"
a further award of damages for the loss of future profits clearly
duplicates losses already considered. As the First Circuit said
in rejecting such a claim, "The Clayton Act gives treble damages,
but it does not contemplate that damages will be sextupled."
The Eighth Circuit distinguished four cases relied upon by
plaintiff on the ground that they involved either the award of
future profits instead of going concern value 10 or the award of
7.

"Going concern" is generally used to describe the value of a

business over and above the value of its tangible assets. It has been

described as
the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of its capital, stock, funds, or
property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or
common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances, or necessities,
or even from ancient partialities, or prejudices.
J. STORY, PARTNERSHIP, 147 (2d ed. 1846).
Substantially the same
description has been used in recent cases. See, e.g., Barran v. Com-

missioner, 334 F.2d 58, 61 (6th Cir. 1964); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v.
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768, 810 (E.D. Pa.
1957).

8. In Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 219 (9th Cir.

1958), the court set forth two factors as appropriate in measuring the
going concern value of a business:
(1) What profit has the business made over and above an
amount fairly attributable to the return on the capital investment and to the labor of the owner? (2) What is the
reasonable prospect that this additional profit will continue
into the future, considering all circumstances existing and
known as of the date of the valuation?
See also Greenwald, Capitalized Pricing of Injury to Capital in Treble
Damage Suits, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 84 (1959); Note, 36 ALBANY L. REV.
773, 779 (1972).
9. Farmington Dowel Products Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d
61, 82 (1st Cir. 1970).

10. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964); Os-

born v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194 F.2d 846 (8th

Cir. 1952).
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lost profits while the plaintiff was still operating the business."
The court concluded that while loss of future profits is an acceptable method for calculating damages to the value of a business under some circumstances, the diminished market value
method is preferable where there is "clear proof in the record
of the value of plaintiff's business as a going concern ....
Had there been serious dispute over the "but for" market
value of the plaintiff's business, the decision to award damages
for diminished market value instead of loss of future profits
would have been less compelling. Estimating future profits involves many uncertainties, such as duration of the business,
fluctuating economic conditions, entry of new competitors, technological developments, and changing consumer attitudes. Determining diminished market value also involves difficult estimates and projections including the estimation of lost future
profits. Thus, it is only because the parties in Albrecht had
agreed upon the "but for" value that the use of this method
was clearly preferred in this case.
Even where diminution of value can be reliably estimated,
however, it is possible that a particular plaintiff's loss of future
profits will not be accurately reflected in the "but for" market
value because of his superior skill, managerial talents, or other
desirable personal attributes which affect profits and cannot be
transferred to a purchaser. 13 In holding that an antitrust injury
occurs to the business and not to the individual proprietor, Albrecht excludes consideration of such individual characteristics
in measuring damages. Excluding consideration of personal
characteristics and the actual loss to the individual plaintiff has
been appropriately criticized on the basis that "[m] ore complete
compensation is provided a plaintiff by making the measure
of damages the profits he lost due to the violation rather than
the market value to someone else of the chance to try to make
them." 14 This method of valuing damage to a business which
11. Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269
F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959).
12. 452 F.2d at 129.
13. The Albrecht court approvingly quoted the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 220 (9th Cir. 1958),
that
[t]he special value which the business might have to Moore
[the plaintiff), or the profit potential of the business beyond
that which would be transferable to a purchaser, would have no
effect on the market value of the business.
452 F.2d at 130.
14. Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Dam-
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the owner has been forced to sell or abandon has apparently
evolved from eminent domain cases, 1r but it is questionable
whether the same policy considerations for limiting compensation should control under antitrust statutes intended to "punish" wrongdoers. Certainly there is a difference between losing
property "for the public good" and losing property because another person has violated the law.
Albrecht correctly decided the narrow question presented
-that an award for diminished market value includes the present value of expected future profits. It leaves for future consideration the larger issues of when damage awards should be
based upon direct measurement of future profits instead of diminished market value, and whether making awards on the basis of damage to a business rather than to the individual affected
will always provide the satisfactory compensation intended by
the antitrust laws. In most cases, there will probably be little
difference between the dollar amounts of awards based on one
method rather than the other. Even if damages were to be
based upon the loss to an individual instead of to a business,
the individual's duty to mitigate'0 would frequently reduce the
award to an amount similar to that resulting from a diminished
market value measurement. Nonetheless, courts should carefully consider whether awards for diminished market value of a
business will in every instance provide satisfactory compensation for those whom antitrust violators drive out of the marketplace.

ages for Destruction of All or Part of a Business, 80 HAIv. L. Rsv. 1566,
1581 (1967) (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 1581 n.80.
16. Id. at 1578.
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Civil Procedure: Discovery Orders Claimed to Violate
Attorney-Client Privilege Reviewable by Mandamus
Certain drug companies were defendants in a number of
consolidated damage suits.' During pretrial proceedings, defendants resisted attempts to discover documents which they
claimed were protected by the attorney-client privilege. However, the district court adopted the finding of the masters that
many of the documents were involved in the perpetration of a
fraud on the Patent Office or a violation of the Sherman AntiTrust Act and issued a discovery order. When the district court
refused to certify the question for interlocutory appeal,2 defendants brought the present action in the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit requesting that a writ of mandamus issue to vacate and rescind the discovery order. The petition was premised on the grounds that use of the attorney-client privilege had
not been connected with the perpetration of fraud and that, in
any case, there was lack of a separate evidentiary basis for the
findings with respect to some of the papers. The Eighth Circuit
held that mandamus was an appropriate vehicle for review because the privilege claim was an extraordinary question for
which later review was an inadequate remedy. It directed the
district court to vacate the discovery order as to some of the
petitioners3 for lack of a prima facie showing of fraud, but held
that in general the fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege had been properly applied below.4 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456
1. The companies were Pfizer, Inc., American Cyanamid, BristolMeyers Company, Squibb Corporation, and the Upjohn Company.
2. The certification procedure is provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1970):

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order

not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the
opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law
as to which there is a substantial ground for a difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals
may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken
from such order....
3. Bristol-Meyers Company, Squibb Corporation, and the Upjohn
Company. The district court was directed, along with the masters, to
carry out its own order with respect to the other petitioners, Pfizer,
Inc. and American Cyanamid.
4. The Eighth Circuit held that the masters and district court
"clearly were aware of the state of the law", 456 F.2d at 549, and correctly found that documents involved in the furtherance of a crime or
tort are not privileged by the attorney-client relationship. See Clark
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F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1972).
The writ of mandamus is one of several extraordinary writs
which federal courts are empowered to issue under the All Writs
Act 5 and has frequently been used for review of discovery orders.
The Supreme Court has held that a court may issue such writs
at any stage of a case where it could properly entertain appeals.'
However, even with such jurisdiction, a court may abuse its
discretion in issuing a writ.7 The exercise of such discretion is
limited to "extraordinary circumstances," such as confining "an
inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction,
[compelling] it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do
S, '8 and correcting a lower court's "abuse of discretion."
The passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b)'o in 1958, allowing interlocutory appeals upon certification by the district judge and
acceptance by the court of appeals, provided an alternative to
mandamus for certain rulings. With such an alternative available, the Supreme Court held in 1967 in Will v. United States"
that extraordinary writs, including mandamus, were to be restrictively issued. 12 Before mandamus may issue to modify a
v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1937); cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939); Securities and Exchange

Commission v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948).
In regard to an allegation of "overbreadth" of the order, the court
found that the masters had sufficiently segregated the documents but
directed the district court and masters to continue to guard the privilege of the petitioners by reviewing all contested documents and ordering the production of only those documents individually found to
have been prepared in perpetration or furtherance of fraudulent activity.
5. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970), provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.
6. The Supreme Court indicated in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,
352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957), that courts of appeals had such "naked power",
although such power would not authorize "indiscriminate use of prerogative writs as a means of reviewing interlocutory orders." Such a
jurisdictional statement has been viewed as an expansion of the traditional role of the courts of appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes,
413 F.2d 1144 n.10 (5th Cir. 1969); Comment, Mandamus Proceedings in

the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Compromise with Finality, 52

CALIF.

L. Rnv. 1036, 1040 (1964).
7. See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957).
8. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967), quoting Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
9. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 257 (1957).
10. See note 2 supra.
11. 389 U.S.90 (1967).
12. According to the Court, mandamus "is not to control the decision of the trial court, but rather merely to confine the lower court to
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discovery order, the Supreme Court has required a showing of
either an abuse of discretion by the district court judge or a lack
of jurisdiction. 13 The courts of appeals, although ostensibly adhering to this standard, have at times not required a very strong
14
showing.
In the instant case, the Eighth Circuit found the writ of
mandamus available without a specific finding that the district
court had abused its discretion or gone beyond its jurisdiction.
Rather, it held that the extraordinary nature of the case and the
impact of the discovery order were sufficient in themselves to
render mandamus an appropriate means of review. In so holding, the court distinguished Will and went further in using mandamus as a tool for review of discovery orders than most courts
of appeals.' 5
The issues raised in the instant case illustrate the tension
between the need for finality and the need for review of certain
interlocutory rulings. Federal law incorporates a strong policy
favoring review only of final judgments10 and disfavoring any
the sphere of its discretionary power." 389 U.S. at 104. However, the
courts of appeals have read Will narrowly and have continued to frequently find extraordinary circumstances justifying the issuance of
such writs. See, e.g., Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. IOS, Ltd.,
459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,
423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971); United States v. Hughes, 388 F.2d 236, 413 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir.
1969). These courts of appeals have emphasized the Supreme Court's
language in Will dealing with the fact that Will involved a criminal
case and that the government would not normally be entitled to an
appeal.
13. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
14. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487
(7th Cir. 1970), a-f'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971),
and text accompanying notes 28-30 infIra.
15. The Seventh Circuit, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court,
400 U.S. 348 (1971), appears to be the only other court of appeals which
has not clearly required a showing of abuse of discretion or action beyond jurisdiction by a district court judge. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Lampman v. United States District Court, 418 F.2d 215
(9th Cir. 1969), Southern Calif. Theatre Owners Ass'n v. United States
District Court, 430 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1970), and most recently in City of
Los Angeles v. Williams, 438 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1971), has adhered to
the standards set out in Will. Similarly, the Second Circuit in Investment Properties International, Ltd. v. IOS, Ltd., 459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1972), has looked to the standards in Will for abuse of discretion before
issuing mandamus.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970); Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Slat. 73,
83-85. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). See also
9 J. MooRE & B. WARu, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.13 (1972); Comment, Mandamus Proceedings in Federal Courts of Appeals: A Compro-
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policy that will lead to piecemeal litigation and prolonged trials.
However, the needs of litigants who will be severely harmed by
a nonreviewable order which remains in effect throughout the
course of the litigation have prompted alternative remedies.' 7
This conflict in basic policies appears to have fostered several
closely related but apparently varying standards for the use of
writs of mandamus.
Never available as merely a substitute for appeal '8 or as a
means of overturning error, 19 mandamus has been viewed by the
Supreme Court as an extraordinary remedy available to courts
of appeal to confine lower courts to their proper sphere of power
or to prevent abuse of discretion and usurpation of power. If
the actions of the lower court did not fall within this arena, mandamus would not lie. This oft-repeated standard forms the ba20
sis of Supreme Court and federal appellate decisions today.
A second interpretation of the role of mandamus, appearing at times to fit within the first, at other times to be a slight
variant of the first, allows the court of appeals to use mandamus
in its "supervisory" capacity over district courts. This supervisory function was invoked by the Supreme Court in La Buy v.
Howes Leather Company,21 and used as a rationale in Schlagenhauf v. Holder,2 2 in which the Court noted the unusual nature
mise with Finality, 52

CALIF. L. REv. 1036 (1964); Comment, Effect of
Mandamus on the Final Decision Rule, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 709 (1962).

17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651 (a) (1970). While Comment, Effect of Mandamus on the Final Decision Rule, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 709 (1962), concludes that the two reme-

dies were intended to apply in basically similar circumstances, and
that it is unlikely a question would be inappropriate for interlocutory
appeal and appropriate for mandamus, 9 J. MOORE & B. WARD, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.22(5) (1972) suggests, more accurately, that their
functions are separate:

that, for example, rulings which may have no

controlling question of law involved may be appropriate for mandamus
while not for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).

18. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947).

19. In Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104 (1967), the Supreme
Court said: "Mandamus, it must be remembered, does not 'run the
gauntlet of reversible errors,'" quoting from Bankers Life & Casualty
Company v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953).

20. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967); Schlagenhauf v. Holden, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); Investment Properties Int'l Ltd. v.
IOS, Ltd., 459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972); Los Angeles v. Williams, 438 F.2d

522 (9th Cir. 1971); Lampman v. United States District Court, 418 F.2d

215 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hughes, 388 F.2d 236, 413 F.2d 1244

(5th Cir. 1968); Allied Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan American World Air-

ways, Inc., 340 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).

21.
22.

352 U.S. 249 (1957).
379 U.S. 104 (1964).
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of the question and the need for a ruling on an issue of first
impression. 23 Even in Will, the most restrictive Supreme Court
mandamus decision, the Court spoke of the writ as serving a
"vital corrective and didactic function." 24 Will held that, even
in that case, the writ might be appropriate if the evidence
had demonstrated the circumstances were of an extraordinary
nature.2 5 The area of overlap between the traditional standard
for mandamus and this supervisory power is not clear. But
some courts of appeals and commentators view these recent
cases as indicative of an expansion of the traditional scope of
mandamus discretion of the courts of appeals to review questions of first impression and to settle questions on which district
26
court judges differ.
Beyond the traditional and the supervisory standards for
the use of mandamus, a few courts have recently indicated that
other "extraordinary circumstances" will be sufficient in themselves to justify the issuance of the writ In Harper & Row
Publishers,Inc. v. Decker,2 7 the Seventh Circuit held that:
[B] ecause maintenance of the attorney-client privilege up to its
proper limits has substantial importance to the administration
of justice, and because an appeal after disclosure is an inadethe extraordinary remedy of mandamus is apquate remedy,
28
propriate.
This decision was upheld without opinion by an equally divided
Supreme Court.29 In the instant case, the Eighth Circuit relied
on Harper & Row and held that, since review on appeal might
prove an inadequate remedy, mandamus was an appropriate vehicle for review of the question before it.
The policies behind the traditional standards are clear: judicial economy requires that the finality rule be observed and
that the courts of appeals review only the work of a judge en23. Id. at 111.

24. 389 U.S. at 107.
25. The Court stated: 'What might be the proper decision upon a
more complete record, supplemented by the findings and conclusions
of the Court of Appeals, we cannot and do not say." Id.
26. See United States v. Hughes, 388 F.2d 236, 413 F.2d 1244 (5th
Cir. 1968), in which the court stated: "Several recent cases point to an
expansion of the scope of mandamus in the exercise of 'supervisory
control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals.'" 413 F.2d at
1247 n.10. See also 9 J. MooRE & B. WARD, MooRE's FErRAL PRAcrcE §
110.28 (1971).
27. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court,
400 U.S. 348 (1971).
28. Id. at 492.
29. 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
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gaged in a frolic3 ° or addressing a question of first impression.
The problems raised by certain rulings on discovery issues, however, present difficulties to the court system and litigants that
will not be solved by such standards. Often outside of traditional mandamus and interlocutory review, yet demanding some
remedy before the continuation of litigation, certain discovery
orders involving truly extraordinary circumstances may arise
and may require a review before time of appeal. Cases involving discovery of information claimed to be privileged present
the most potential dangers, for an erroneous ruling will be virtually uncorrectable on appeal, and the party forced to disclose
such documents may be effectively foreclosed from any right to
meaningful appeal after disclosure.
The writ of mandamus, as utilized by the court in Pfizer, provides an ideal vehicle for the litigant who believes himself severely damaged by a district court's discovery ruling. While
availability of mandamus review may present dangers of spurious claims of privilege, similar dangers of spurious claims of
abuse of discretion have been present in traditional mandamus
standards, and courts which reserve such mandamus review for
the case involving "extraordinary circumstances" should be inviting no more spurious claims than in the past. Several courts
of appeals have now recognized mandamus discretion to be
broad enough to encompass such review of discovery, and the
Eighth Circuit's opinion in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord strengthens this
position.

Civil Rights: Parallel Remedy for Private Discrimination
In Employment Provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Plaintiff alleged that defendant Bristol-Meyers had discharged her because of her race and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as the recovery of back wages. Federal
jurisdiction was asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19641 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a civil rights statute enacted
in 1866.2 Title VII explicitly proscribes racial discrimination in
30.

9 J. MOORE & B. WARD, MooRE'S

FEDERAL

PRACTICE

§ 110.28

(1971).

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964), §§ 701-716(c) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
2.

42

U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
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employment, while section 1981 provides in part: "All persons
shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts
...." The district court granted summary judgment for
Bristol-Meyers, holding that the action was time-barred under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that section 1981
did not reach purely private discriminatory employment prac...

tices. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that
section 1981 does apply to private actions and that enactment of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not preempt or
repeal by implication the rights granted under section 1981.
Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972).
In rejecting defendant's argument that section 1981 did not
encompass private discrimination, the court relied on Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer.3 The Supreme Court held in Jones that 42
U.S.C. § 1982, a companion to section 1981 dealing with the right
to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey" real and personal property, applied to private discrimination. After extensive analysis of the statutory language of section 1982 and the
legislative history, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act
was intended to apply to all racially motivated acts, both public
and private, in the sale and rental of property. The Jones
Court also found that Congress had the power to enact section
1982 pursuant to the thirteenth amendment.
The Jones opinion suggesed that its holding would apply to
section 1981 as well 4 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International
Harvester,5 held that since section 1981 and section 1982 were
derived directly from section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act," private acts were within section 1981 under the Jones rationale.
The Brady court also rejected defendant's argument that
the 1964 Civil Rights Act had preempted existing rights under
section 1981. The court noted that Title VII of the 1964 Civil
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
3. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
4. Id. at 422 &nL28, 442 n.78.
5. 427 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
6. Id.
7. See also Young v. International Telephone and Telegraph
Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d
1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
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Rights Act was far broader than section 1981, since it applies
to discrimination based on race, religion, sex and national origin,
while section 1981 applies only to racial discrimination. Further,
the court indicated that its attention had been directed to nothing in the legislative history or decisions under Title VII supporting the preemption theory.8 The court concluded that Title VII
is a parallel federal prohibition against racial discrimination in
employment in the private sector and as such does not detract
from rights under section 1981.
There is ample precedent for the court's conclusion. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,9 the United States Supreme
Court again dealt with section 1982. The Court there noted:
Section 1982 derived from the 1866 Act is plainly "not inconsistent" with the 1964 Act, which has been construed as not
"pre-empting every other mode of protecting a federal 'right'
or as granting immunity" to those who had long been subject
to federal law. [Citations omitted] 10
The Sullivan reasoning was applied to section 1981 in both Waters" and Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.12 Both decisions, noting the absence of explicit repeal, reviewed the requirements for
repeal by implication set out by the Supreme Court in Posadas
v. National City Bank:13 an irreconcilable conflict between provisions in the two acts and a clear and manifest legislative intent to repeal the earlier act. The Waters court reasoned that,
although there were numerous areas of possible conflict between
section 1981 and Title VII, the statutes were not irreconcilable
since the conflicts could be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, it was necessary for the court to harmonize the two statutes. The plaintiff in Waters had not sought relief through the
conciliation procedures of the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission before filing suit under section 1981. The court
pointed out that Congress had placed strong emphasis on conciliation in establishing the E.E.O.C. and its procedures and
for that reason concluded that "aggrieved persons should [not]
be allowed intentionally to by-pass the Commission without
good reason.' 4 It found "good reason" on the facts before it,15
8.
9.

Id.
396 U.S. 229 (1969).

10. Id. at 238.
11. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
12.
13.

431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
296 U.S. 497 (1936).

14. 427 F.2d at 487.
15. In the Waters case E.E.O.C. action had been instituted against
the defendant company but not against defendant local union. The
court noted that the primary charge of racial discrimination made by
the plaintiffs was based on an amendment to a collective bargaining
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and did not generalize further as to what constitutes "good reason."
In Young v. International Telephone and Telegraph Co.,16
the court likewise reviewed the differences between section 1981
and Title VII, including the Title VII emphasis on conciliation.
The defendant in Young argued that the Waters holding required an exhaustion of E.E.O.C. remedies or a justifiable excuse
for failure to do so. The Young court concluded that there was
nothing in Title VII to suggest such a requirement, although it
stated somewhat cryptically that "due regard to the conciliation
jurisdiction of the E.E.O.C. [could] be afforded by the District
Courts short of the erection of a jurisdictional bar."' 7 It nonetheless found that the availability of conciliation remedies under
Title VII did not create irreconcilable conflict with section 1981.
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Brady made no specific
mention of exhaustion or excuse requirements and did not reveal
whether there was "good reason" for plaintiff's failure to seek
E.E.O.C. remedies or whether plaintiff actually had sought such
remedies. Further, the court did not consider whether plaintiff
was justified in failing to bring suit under Title VII before such
an action was time-barred. The absence of discussion of available E.E.O.C. remedies together with the reference to the Waters
and Young opinions suggests that exhaustion of such remedies or
justifiable excuse will not be required. Although the court failed
to make this matter entirely clear, the decision does extend significant employment protection to racial minorities within the
jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit. While Title VII of the 1964
Act will probably continue to provide the main statutory tool in
this area, section 1981 will be useful in circumstances where
Title VII is not applicable. 8
agreement between the two defendants, made after the E.E.O.C. charges
had been filed. Until the amendment, the court said, the plaintiffs
were at least arguably unaware of the local union's participation in
the company's alleged policy of racial discrimination. Further, the
court said that affidavits before it indicated that the local union was
aware of the charges against the company, and therefore had been
only slightly prejudiced by the plaintiff's failure to charge it before the
E.E.O.C. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co.,
427 F.2d at 487.
16. 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
17. 438 F.2d at 763.
18. For example, Title VII applies only to employers in interstate
commerce, employing 25 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1970). It does not cover the United States or state governments or Indian tribes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1) (1970). It does not cover private
clubs, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2) (1970), or the employment of individuals
performing educational functions for educational institutions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1 (1970).
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Civil Rights: Private Conspiracy in Deprivation of First
Amendment Rights Reached By 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
Action, a predominantly black human rights organization,
staged a series of demonstrations at a church whose predominantly white parishioners were warned that these "Black Sunday" demonstrations would continue for six months unless a
number of "demands" made by the demonstrators were met.
Each demonstration resulted in the disruption of church services.
Following the fourth demonstration, the pastor, parishioners,
and the Archbishop of the diocese in which the church was located, sought injunctive relief in federal district court.
The district court granted a permanent injunction against
the defendants' "because defendants will continue to disrupt...
the worship services and meetings of the Cathedral parish ...
and will deprive the plaintiffs and parishioners ... of their Constitutional and civil rights . . . enjoyed by other citizens of the
United States ... unless restrained by order of this Court ....

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (3) reached wholly private conspiracies, that sections one
and five of the fourteenth amendment provided a constitutional
source of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy
present in the instant case, and that injunctive relief was available under section 1985 (3). Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227
(8th Cir. 1971).3

The Eighth Circuit's decision that the section five enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment 4 can be used as the
constitutional basis for congressional power to reach private conspiracies is a bold departure from long established constitutional
principles. If the rationale of Action is accepted by other federal courts, section five can be used as a basis for protecting from
wholly private interference all civil rights previously found to
be incorporated in the fourteenth amendment.
1. Another black organization was also enjoined since it knew of,

took part in and helped plan many demonstrations against churches in
the area, although it did not directly participate in the demonstrations
involved in this lawsuit.
2. Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240, 1248 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
3.

Modifying and affirming 303 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1969).

Action was decided by the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 states: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
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Section 1985 (3)5 was originally enacted as part of the sweeping Reconstruction civil rights legislation designed to eradicate
"the badges and the incidents of slavery." However, the broad
scope of section 1985(3) has not been effectuated until recently. 7
Instead, the statute has suffered from the restrictive judicial
interpretation associated with other Reconstruction civil rights
legislation.
8
In United States v. Harris,
the Supreme Court held the exact
criminal counterpart of section 1985(3) 9 applicable to private
conspiracies in deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights.
However, the Court then found the statute to be unconstitutional since the scope of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment was not thought to extend to private conduct
This position was reaffirmed one year later in the famous Civil
Rights Cases.10 Probably as a result of the doubts raised as to
its constitutionality by Harris and the Civil Rights Cases, section 1985 (3) lay dormant for many years."

However, when suit was brought under section 1985(3) in
Collins v. Hardyman12 against private citizens who had disrupted the plaintiffs political meetings, the Court avoided the
constitutional question raised by Harrisby holding that the complaint did not state a cause of action. Applying the theory developed in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court reasoned that wholly
private acts could not deprive others of "equal protection of the
law" or "equal privileges and immunities under the law."
Such private discrimination is not inequality before the
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) [hereinafter cited as § 1985(3)1
provides in relevant part:
If two or more persons ... conspire or go . .. in disguise
on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws... whereby another is injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages ....
6. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
7. Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), eliminated the restrictive "color of law" requirement from section 1985 (3).
8. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
9. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (repealed 1909).
10. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11. From the date of its enactment until 1920, there were no reported cases involving section 1985(3). Comment, The Civil Rights
Act: Emergence of an Adequate Civil Remedy?, 26 IN. L.J. 361, 363
(1951).
12. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
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law unless there is some manipulation of the
law or its agencies
3
to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so.1
In other words, without some "manipulation of the law or its
agencies," the conspiracy victim's "rights under the laws...
remain untouched .... "14 In effect, the Collins Court found that
the phrases "equal protection" and "equal privileges" of the law
inherently included a state action requirement, and thus a "color
of law" requirement was read into section 1985(3) even though
the statute did not contain the phrase. While the Court in Collins emphasized that it was merely construing the language of
the statute, 15 it was nevertheless obvious that the Court was influenced by constitutional considerations:
It is apparent that, if this complaint meets the requirements of [the] Act, it raises constitutional problems of the
first magnitude .... 16
Thus, by reading into the statute a state action requirement,
Collins avoided these constitutional issues.
The "color of law" or state action requirement imposed in
Collins was, with few exceptions, followed by the lower federal
courts.'7 However, as Supreme Court cases continued to erode
and dilute the state action concept,' the validity of retaining a
state action requirement in section 1985(3) seemed doubtful. In
Griffin v. Breckinridge'9 the "color of law" limitation placed on
section 1985(3) by Collins was removed. In Griffin, the plaintiffs, black citizens of Mississippi, charged that the defendants,
white citizens of Mississippi, had conspired to deprive them of
the equal protection of the laws and equal privileges and immunities under the laws. Defendants had allegedly stopped the
plaintiffs on public highways, held them at bay with firearms
and severely beat them. Seeking compensatory and punitive
13. Id. at 661.
14. Id. (emphasis in original).
15. Id. at 662.
16. Id. at 659.
17. See, e.g., Erlich v. Van Epps, 428 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1970); Wallach v. Cannon, 357 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1966); Hoffman v. Haldsen, 268
F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959). But see Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d 284
(7th Cir. 1953).
18. The Supreme Court found "state action" present in each of the
following cases: Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (state constitutional amendment by public referendum permitting individuals to sell
or rent property to whomever they choose); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296 (1966) (municipality's management of park given in trust for whites
only); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcement of
a private covenant prohibiting the sale of property to blacks); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (delegation by state of public function to
privately incorporated town).
19. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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damages, plaintiffs sought relief in federal court, but both the
district and circuit courts, relying on Collins, dismissed the suit
for failure to state a cause of action.2 0
In the Supreme Court, however, the decision was reversed.
Noting that since Collins did not consider constitutional issues,
there was no need to determine whether it was correctly decided on its own facts, the Court went on to demonstrate convincingly that the apparent meaning of section 1985 (3), its structural relationship to other similar civil rights legislation, and the
statute's legislative history "all ... point unwaveringly to §
1985(3)'s coverage of private conspiracies." 21 But the Court
also stated that section 1985(3) did not reach all private conspiracies, but rather only those where there was "some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. '2 2 The Court had no doubt
that racial, invidiously discriminatory animus was present in
the case before it. 23 As to the constitutionality of the statute,
the Court stated:
That § 1985(3) reaches private conspiracies ... cause[s]
no doubts of its constitutionality. It has long been settled that
18 U.S.C. § 241 ... reaches wholly private conspiracies and is
constitutional. Our inquiry, therefore, need go only to identifying a source of congressional
power [to reach the private con4
spiracy alleged] in this case.2
It is significant that the Court found this source of congressional power under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment since
"there has never been any doubt of the power of Congress to
impose liability on private persons under § 2 of that amend2
ment." 5
In Action the defendant's main contention, that section
1985(3) could not be the basis of an injunction because it does
not apply to private conspiracies, had already been resolved by
Griffin. Clearly, according to Griffin, certain private conspiracies could be reached by section 1985(3). For section 1985(3)
to apply, the Eighth Circuit had only to determine whether the
private conspiracy present in Action was a private conspiracy
motivated by a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."2 0 Because Action purport20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
403 U.S. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 102.
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edly acted on behalf of the black citizens of St. Louis, there is
little doubt that the court's conclusion that "the defendants were
stimulated to disrupt the church services by racial ... motives ' 27 was correct. However, the court's determination that
the private conspiracy present in Action was of the type covered
by the terms of section 1985(3) still did not resolve the question
of whether section 1985 can be constitutionally applied to the
facts of the case. Following the rationale of Griffin, the Eighth
Circuit still had to find a constitutional source of congressional
power to reach the private conspiracy present in Action.
First, the court determined that the plaintiff's first amendment rights of freedom of assembly and worship were protected
from state action by the fourteenth amendment, 28 a decision supported by the great weight of authority on the issue. 29 However, the court then departed from established constitutional
principles by concluding that section five of the fourteenth
amendment gave Congress the power to protect the first amendment rights of freedom of assembly and worship from private
action. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied heavily on
two sources: the concurring opinions of Justices Clark and Brennan in United States v. Guest 30 and the history surrounding the
drafting and adoption of the fourteenth amendment.
In Guest the defendants were six private individuals who
were indicted under the criminal counterpart of section
1985(3)31 for conspiring to deprive black citizens of equal access
27. 450 F.2d at 1232.
28. Id. at 1235.
29. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v.

Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879); see also Ruslander, Religious Liberty as Judicially Defined, 13
U. PITT. L.REv. 666 (1952).
It should be noted that Action also protects freedom of assembly
from private action. This, too, departs from well-established constitutional principles. See United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-53
(1875).

30.
31.

383 U.S.745 (1966).
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970) states:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten,
or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised
the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or
on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so securedThey shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both; and if death results, they
shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for
life.
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to state facilities. The opinion of the Court did not reach the
state action limitation generally placed on section five of the
fourteenth amendment, but instead upheld the indictment on
the ground that additional allegations indicated the defendants
may have been aided by state officials. However, in separate
concurring opinions, a majority of the Court subscribed to the
view that section five of the fourteenth amendment authorized
Congress to legislate against all conspiracies which interfere
32
with rights protected by the amendment.
Apparently, the Eighth Circuit has interpreted the Guest
decision as eliminating the state action limitation placed on congressional power under section five of the fourteenth amendment despite other elements of Guest that undermine the broad
language used in the concurring opinions. First, both opinions
refer to a fact situation involving the use of state facilities. As
one commentator has noted:
[T]hough both Justices Clark and Brennan explicitly rejected the traditional "state action" concept to the extent that
a finding of positive state participation in discriminatory activity should no longer be required in order to invoke federal
legislation designed to protect the enjoyment of fourteenth
amendment rights, neither suggested that affirmative state
ac33
tion is no longer essential for the creationof those rights.
Thus, both opinions can be interpreted to mean that once the
state has affirmatively acted by creating public facilities, it then
has an affirmative duty to see that all citizens have equal access
to those facilities. While this more limited interpretation of the
concurring opinions characterizes them as mere modifications
of earlier definitions of the state action concept, it is the one
accepted by most commentators on the Guest case. 34 Moreover,
this view is supported by other evidence, such as Justice Brennan's repeated references to state facilities and Justice Clark's
joining in the majority opinion of United States v. Price,3 5 decided on the same day as Guest, which recognized a state action
requirement.
The second basis of support for the court's conclusion in
Action that the fourteenth amendment could be used as a source
of congressional power to reach private conspiracies is the history surrounding the framing and adoption of that amendment.
The court noted that:
32. 383 U.S. at 762, 782.
33. Comment, Constitutional and Jurisdictional Problems in the
Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 52 B.U.L. REv. 599, 613 (1972).
34. See Comment, Civil Rights-Expansion of Remedies Under
42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 37 Mo. L. REv. 525, 528 n.38 (1972).
35. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
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according to the purpose and intention of the Amendment as
disclosed in the debates in Congress and in the several state
Legislatures and in other ways, Congress had the constitutional
power to enact direct legislation to secure the rights of citizens
against violation by individuals as well as by States.30

The court then concluded that the framers of the fourteenth
amendment intended Congress to have the power to regulate
37
private discriminatory conduct.
Two objections can be made to the Eighth Circuit's use of
the history surrounding the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. First, an equally plausible argument, that the framers
did not intend Congress to have the power to reach private conduct, can be made. Indeed,
any theory based on the congressional debates is inconclusive
due to the fact that there were two and possibly three factions
debating the amendment's scope and, as a result, the intent of
the framers38 . . .was not clearly expressed in the course of the

discussion.
Second, the controversy surrounding the history of the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment is not a new phenomenon. Presumably, arguments based on such history have been presented
to the Supreme Court many times. Since such arguments have
apparently not compelled the Supreme Court to eliminate the
state action requirement, it is difficult to see why the Eighth
Circuit should do so.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the fourteenth
amendment can be used as a source of congressional power to
reach private conspiracies was not compelled, nor perhaps
proper, under established constitutional principles. Even if it is
assumed that the court in Action is correct in surmising that
Congress has the power to reach private conspiracies under the
fourteenth amendment, section 1985(3) certainly is not clear authority for the proposition that Congress has exercised that
power. In Griffin, the Supreme Court upheld the statute's
power to reach private conspiracies under the thirteenth amendment because both the statute and the thirteenth amendment
were intended to protect blacks in the exercise of their newly
acquired rights. However, Action has potentially created an
entirely new set of substantive civil rights. In the past, certain
rights, such as the fourth amendment guarantee that "the right
of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches
36.

450 F.2d at 1237, quoting H.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 277 (1908).

37.
38.

450 F.2d at 1237.
Comment,

supra note 34, at 529.

FLACK,

THE ADOPTIoN OF THE
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and seizures," were thought to be protected solely from governmental interference. 39 Other rights, such as those guaranteed
by the thirteenth amendment and the right to interstate travel,
were protected from both private and governmental interference. 40 Under the Action rationale there is no reason why all
rights guaranteed by the bill of rights that have been held applicable against the states should not also be protected from
private interference under section 1985(3). Although it may be
desirable for civil rights to be protected from private action, it
is presumably the function of state law to guard those rights
not protected from private interference by the Constitution directly, or by federal statute authorized by the Constitution. It
can be argued that state law is not fulfilling its function, and
federal regulation of private discriminatory conduct is necessary.
Even so, it is questionable whether the remedy furnished by
Action is appropriate. By interpreting section 1985(3) to allow
federal regulation of private conduct, previously solely regulated by the states, the Eighth Circuit has modified the very
framework of federal government-the division of powers between the national and state governments. This modification
was accomplished without any clear authority for the proposition that Congress is constitutionally permitted to regulate in
this area, and without any indication that, even if it had the
constitutional power to do so, Congress desired to act in such a
manner. Thus, the desirability of the result in Action is far
from clear.

Civil Rights: Seniority System Discrimination Remedied

By Allowance of 50% Seniority Rights
Prior to enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
defendants, the Frisco Railroad and the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen (later succeeded by the United Transportation Union),
had excluded blacks from the job of railroad brakeman. In order to offset the discrimination, black porters, who had lost their
jobs in 1967 when Frisco eliminated passenger service, were given
preference in hiring for new positions. However, blacks were
not given credit for time served as porters in determining their
39. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
40. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966).
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seniority. This practice had the effect of giving white brakemen a competitive advantage in the bidding for higher echelon
brakeman's jobs.
The Government brought suit to force Frisco and the union
to reclassify the former porters as brakemen and to merge the
two crafts to allow blacks to claim seniority accumulated as
train porters in their new classification. It argued that porters
had been deprived of the opportunity to acquire seniority as
brakemen by pre-1964 discriminatory exclusion. The trial court
denied the request principally on the ground that a seniority system based on business necessity escapes Title VII proscription,,
and a panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed.2 Upon rehearing
en banc, however, the court reversed and remanded, holding
(1) that Frisco and the union had overtly discriminated against
blacks prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; ' (2)
that the continuing effect of the past discrimination perpetuated itself in Frisco's refusal to award the train porters any
seniority; and (3) that awarding the porters 50 per cent seniority
credit for their past service was consistent with adequate safeguards for safety and efficiency, and hence was not barred by
the business necessity doctrine. United States v. St. Louis-S.F.
Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972).
White brakemen on passenger trains were able to use seniority accumulated in passenger service to bid on vacancies in
freight service after the discontinuance of passenger service in
1967. On the other hand, black train porters were not permitted
to transfer any portion of their seniority to bid for openings
in any other craft, in spite of the fact that they performed many
of the same services as brakemen. As noted above, this lack of
seniority also impinged on the ability of a black, once hired as a
brakeman, to bid successfully for higher echelon jobs.
Relying on Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,4 the Court held that
this practice, though neutral on its face, in effect continued prior
discriminatory employment practices and hence was violative of
1. United States ex rel. Clark v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 52 F.R.D. 270
(E.D. Mo. 1971).
2. United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972).
3. The court rested its finding of pre-1964 discrimination on the
existence from 1928 to 1949 of a written agreement between Frisco and
the union which absolutely precluded the hiring of black brakemen by
Frisco, and from the fact that from 1949 to 1966 only one of 750 newly
hired brakemen was black. United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464
F.2d 301, 307 (8th Cir. 1972).

4. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
examinations.

Griggs dealt with the use of employment
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the 1964 Act. It had been argued that since Title VII was not
intended to apply retroactively to reach past discrimination, an
employment practice neutral as to race was not in violation of
the act even though it perpetuated past discrimination. 5 In
Griggs, however, the Supreme Court held that practices neutral on their face are nonetheless in violation of the act if they
perpetuate the discriminatory effect of pre-1964 conduct.0
Section 703 of Title VI[' prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race" or from "uniting, segregating, or
classifying an employee in any way which would deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race."
Prior Eighth Circuit opinions interpreting Title VII foreshadowed the result in Frisco. In United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers, Local 36,8 a union allowed blacks to join for the first
time in 1967, but continued its referral system of recommending
members for employment based upon length of industry experience, even though union membership was a prerequisite to
such experience. The system was found to be in violation of
Title VII:
Because the plans carry forward the effects of former discriminatory practices, they result in present and future discrimination
and are violative of Title VII of the Act.9
The issue was all but foreclosed in United States v. National
Lead Co. 10 Although the defendant in that case abolished separate black and white departments in 1962, vacancies in depart5. Id. at 428.
6.

Id. at 430.

7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970). An important proviso to this
section is contained in section 703 (h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (h) (1970):
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different... terms [or] conditions .. .of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system provided
that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race ....
Although not mentioned by the court in Frisco, this proviso has been
interpreted by other courts as not applicable in a situation such as that
in Frisco because (1) a seniority system based on earlier discriminatory
job assignments is not bona fide and (2) because the discriminatory effect of a seniority system such as Frisco's is the "result of an intention
to discriminate because of race"-here a pre-1964 intention. See Quarles
v. Philips Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
8. 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
9. Id. at 131.
10. 438 F.2d 935 (8th Cir. 1971).
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ments continued to be filled according to departmental rather
than plant-wide seniority. The court held that although this
practice appeared racially neutral, it built "upon pre-Title VII
bias to produce present discrimination .... -11 Numerous decisions in other jurisdictions, both before and after Griggs, have
2
reached the same result as Frisco.1
Defendants' principal contention in Frisco was that a seniority system necessary to business efficiency and safety was not in
violation of Title VII. The business necessity doctrine originated
in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 13 where it was held that a discriminatory practice comported with Title VII only when conceived out of business necessity. Griggs substantially increased
the burden of showing business necessity:
The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be 14
shown to be
related to job preferences,the practice is prohibited.
Decisions subsequent to Griggs have imposed a further requirement of essentiality. Thus the employer must show that there
is no other method of achieving approximately the same job efficiency and safety that has less discriminatory effect. 16
Relying on these decisions, the Frisco court concluded that
there was no showing that the seniority system was essential
to job efficiency and safety. Several findings led the court to
believe that experience and seniority as a brakeman were not
essential to the porters' adequate performance in any of the
brakeman positions. 16 Although the court denied the Government's request for merger of the crafts of porter and brakeman,
it gave each former porter seniority credit as a brakeman for
11. Id. at 937.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th
Cir. 1972); Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969).
13. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).

14. 401 U.S. at 431.
15. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d
Cir. 1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th
Cir. 1970).

16. First, train porters who did transfer to duties as brakemen,
without seniority, were not given any special training; their student
runs were waived and they immediately started their new freight braking duties. Second, the train porters had performed many braking
functions while working as porters. Third, the train porters were apparently capable of learning any additional duties the brakeman craft
entailed. Finally, the court noted that under Frisco's procedures it
was unnecessary for a brakeman to perform one type of braking service before bidding on another type, so long as he had enough total
seniority as a brakeman. 464 F.2d at 308.
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50 per cent of his experience as a porter. Frisco was required
to implement a training program for the porters, but it was not
required to accept any porter as a brakeman if he was not found
qualified according to reasonable safety-related standards.
A correct application of the business necessity doctrine begins with the assumption that whenever a worker has suffered
discrimination, he is entitled to be put in the position he would
have occupied absent discrimination. Only where this remedy
17
would dimGish efficiency and safety is this relief unwarranted
The business necessity doctrine had been one of total preclusion
of remedy, addressed to the issue of liability rather than to the
determination of remedy. The Frisco court, however, used the
doctrine to measure the appropriate amount of relief, quite apart
from the initial question of liability.
The court's decision to award only partial seniority credit
was based upon its determination that some of the train porters
would not have chosen to become brakemen prior to 1964 even
in the absence of discriminatory exclusion, and upon a finding
that the porter-brakeman jobs did not involve entirely similar
tasks."" As such, the court's approach amounts to an application
of a "partial necessity" doctrine. Since the two jobs were not
functionally identical, it could not be assumed, for example, that
a porter with 12 years experience was fully qualified to assume
a brakeman's position that required 12 years seniority as a
brakeman. In some measure, experience as a brakeman was
found necessary for higher order brakeman positions. However,
this reasoning seems contrary to the court's own finding that
there was no evidence that a porter could not perform as adequately as a brakeman with the same number of years employment. In fact, its holding that no unqualified worker need be
promoted seems to preclude any occurrence of incompetence.
Finally, the court's refusal to award back wages does not
comport with decisions in other circuits. 19 The relief provision
in Title VII empowers the court to "enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative actions as may be appropriate, which may include
17. The employee must be given training before he is measured
for efficiency and safety. See, e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 459 (5th Cir. 1971).
18. 464 F.2d at 308.
19. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
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reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay ....-20 It was generally understood that relief under Title
VII was to place the injured worker where he would have been
absent discrimination. The majority in Frisco, however, makes
the test one of intent-if overt post-1964 discriminatory intent
exists, back pay is warranted, but otherwise it is not. Such a
test was specifically rejected by the Fourth Circuit in Robinson
21
v. LorillardCorp.

The Frisco decision creates a virtual affirmative duty on
the part of employers to fashion some form of remedy for past
discrimination where present policies perpetuate that discrimination. Present neutral intent is no defense, nor is the fact
that the practice is conceived out of business necessity a defense. It was principally for these reasons that three judges
dissented, arguing that a seniority system is valid if "conceived
' 22
out of business necessity and not out of racial discrimination.
That view seems inconsistent with the mandate laid down by
the Supreme Court in Griggs, which
focuses upon the discrimi23
natory effects rather than intent.

The decision, however, also creates problems for plaintiffs.
Although the burden of showing overriding business necessity
will shift to the employer upon a showing that a practice perpetuates past discrimination, the plaintiff will have to demonstrate a lack of business necessity in order to avoid a reduction
in requested relief due to the application of the "partial necessity" approach adopted by the Frisco court. Plaintiffs must also
demonstrate present discriminatory intent in order to recover
back wages. 24 While the holding in Frisco on the issue of continuing effects of past discrimination is in line with precedent, its
handling of the remedial issues is based in part on internally
inconsistent reasoning and provides less than satisfactory guidance for future cases.

20.

42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(g) (1970).

21.
22.
23.
24.

444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
464 F.2d at 314.
Id.
It was on this point that Judge Heany dissented in part from

the majority opinion. 464 F.2d at 313.
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Constituiional Law: Due Process Violated by Mid-Term

Dismissal Of Teacher Without Notice or Hearing
Plaintiff, a black, had been a teacher in a junior high school
for over eleven years and was engaged in extensive extramural
work, including '!moonlighting" as a minister and juvenile probation officer, and in conducting youth, civil rights, and political
activities. Believing these activities to be interfering with the
performance of his classroom duties, the Superintendent of
Schools held several meetings to encourage him to curtail them.
In response, plaintiff denied taking part in any activities which
adversely affected the operation of the school but agreed to refrain from holding late evening meetings when young children
were in attendance. In a letter to the Superintendent, he expressed resentment at what he considered to be unreasonable attempts to restrict his civic activities and stated that:
I will not meet with you again on these matters unless my

Principal has been notified, and my accuser present.1
The Superintendent presented the letter to the School Board and
indicated that it would be difficult for him to work with plaintiff in the future. Upon instruction of the Board, the Superintendent summarily discharged plaintiff without notice or a hearing.
Without requesting a hearing, plaintiff brought an action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requesting an injunction requiring
his reinstatement and back pay for the period between his termination and the end of the academic year. The district court dismissed the complaint on the merits, determining that the termination was for good cause. 2 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that a peremptory, mid-term dismissal without notice and an opportunity to respond violates
procedural rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Cooley v. Board of Education, 453 F.2d 282 (8th
Cir. 1972).
Many rationales may be advanced to protect against an
abuse of discretion in cases involving termination from public
employment. For example, the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth principles3 have been applied to invalidate the general
1. Cooley v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 282, 284-85 (8th Cir. 1972).
2. Cooley v. Board of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
3. See Graham, Freedom of Speech of the Public School Teacher,
19 CLEV. ST.L. REv. 382 (1970).
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dismissal provisions of the tenure laws. The ninth amendment
may include a right to be free from arbitrary government action
as a right "retained by the people"; 4 and the equal protection
clause may prevent an arbitrary dismissal when one member of
the class of public employees receives discriminatory treatment."
However, these arguments have ordinarily been rejected by the
courts in favor of those available under the due process clause.
Possible modes of analysis under the due process clause include the right to teach, a right to public employment, and a
general due process right. Although some courts have recognized a right to teach as a "liberty" within the scope of the fourteenth amendment, 6 the right to teach has not been readily ac7
cepted by most courts as a right of constitutional dimensions.
Similarly, the argument that public employment is a protected
property right has largely been rejected by the courts. s
Rather, in dealing with dismissal cases most courts have employed a general due process right to be free from arbitrary
and capricious action by the state.9 In doing so, the courts have
practically avoided the requirement of a "life, liberty, or property" right by shifting the focus of inquiry to whether the government has an obligation within the particular factual circumstances to act fairly. This shift is accomplished by the use of
a balancing test initially prescribed by Cafeteria Workers v.
4. The same arguments used under the due process clauses may
be used under the ninth amendment because it has been suggested that
"there would appear to be no significant difference between judicially
created substantive rights under the Fifth Amendment and the openended use of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to achieve the same results," Note, Dismissal of Federal Employees-the Emerging Judicial
Role, 66 COLO. L. REV. 719 (1966).

5. Even though it may be found that no one has a right to public
employment, in determining whom to admit and whom to retain, the
government cannot establish a criterion or basis of classification that
is arbitrary or discriminatory. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439
(1968).

6. See, eg., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
7. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965) (dictum).
8. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1960); Freeman v.
Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 843 (1969). See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
9. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971); Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435
F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.
1970); Birnbaum v. Trussel, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966); Johnson v.
Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967);
Gouge v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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McElroy,10 where the interests of the government were weighed
against the interests of the individual employee. This balancing test has proven very flexible in that it affords the possibility
of prescribing due process requirements according to the equities of specific fact situations. Because it focuses on "interests"
rather than "rights" or "privileges," it avoids the right-privilege
controversy."
In the most recent decision involving the termination of a
public employee, however, the right-privilege distinction may

have been revitalized. In Board of Regents v. Roth" - the contract of a non-tenured teacher was not renewed for the next
academic year. The district court ruled in favor of the teacher,
balancing the interest of the state in ridding itself of inadequate
teachers against the economic and professional interests of the
teacher. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 13 but
the Supreme Court reversed.14 The Court held that the requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of
interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property:
A weighing process has long been a part of any determination
of the form of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to determine whether due process
requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the
"weight" but to the nature of the interest at stake [citation
omitted]. We must look to see if the interest is within the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.25
Finding that Roth had not shown that a "liberty" or "property"
right had been invaded in the refusal to rehire him, the Court
held that Roth was not entitled to a hearing upon termination.
The general due process right and the balancing test to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first instance were rejected.
In Cooley, however, the Eighth Circuit applied a balancing
test to find a general due process right to be free from arbitrary
dismissal. The court stated:
10. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). In Cafeteria Workers the generalized governmental interest in the national security was balanced against the
particularized interest of an individual excluded from working on a
specified military base.
11.

Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L

REv. 1045, 1080 (1968). See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightPrivilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HAzv. L. Rsv. 1439 (1968).
12. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
13. 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971).
14. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
15. Id. at 570-71.
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We think . . . that as a matter of procedural Due Process the
interest of a public school teacher in his continued employment
until the natural expiration of the academic years is, in the
absence of a countervailing state interest of paramount significance, sufficiently fundamental to prohibit his mid-term discharge without an explication of the reasons which underlie
termination and the opportunity meaningfully to be heard with
regard thereto.' 6
In applying this test, the court was especially influenced by the
fact that Cooley was dismissed in the middle of a school term.
Although the court explicitly emphasized the hardship of a midyear discharge, other factors were no doubt considered.
On the one hand, there are many state interests involved in
a claim for virtually unrestricted power to dismiss.1'7 The educational process may be jeopardized by internal conflict over the
dismissal of a teacher and by the retention of dissident and inadequate faculty members.1 s Moreover, the necessity of upholding
procedural requirements in dismissing a teacher may divert
funds committed to an educational program and affect the quality of instruction. Hearing requirements may also seriously affect hiring practices by preventing the hiring of instructors for
experimental programs, perpetuating teachers in positions for
which they are not suited, and restricting the employment of innovative teachers. Finally, the hearing requirement may affect
the overall operating efficiency of the school system.
On the other hand, numerous interests of the individual
teacher must be considered. A termination of employment deprives the intructor of his present source of livelihood; it may
require him to relocate and thereby cause disruption of his life
as well as financial hardship. Dismissal may stigmatize the
teacher, thereby jeopardizing his chances for future employment and professional advancement. The threat of unrestricted
termination power may also inhibit the judicially recognized
"freedom to inquire, study and evaluate," which is an essential
element of academic freedom.' 9 Finally, specific constitutional
16. 453 F.2d at 286-87.
17. See Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (lst Cir.
1970); Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969); Comment, Due Process Restrictions on
the Employment Power and the Teaching Profession, 50 NEB. L. Ray.
655, 662-63 (1971); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81
HAiv. L. Ray. 1045, 1081-84 (1968).
18. Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1157
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
19. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). See also Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure,
and the Law: A Comment on Worzella v. Board of Regents, 73 HARV.
L. REV.304 (1959).
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guarantees, such as the freedom of speech, may be affected under the guise of dismissal for cause where termination proceedings are virtually nonreviewable and the state is free to act ar2o
bitrarily.
The weighing of these equities favors recognizing due process limitations on the dismissal power "in the absence of a countervailing state interest of paramount significance." 2' The requirement of a hearing would not substantially disrupt the operating efficiency of the school system since the form of hearing
may be adapted to the particular circumstances. For example,
where publicity threatens to disrupt school activities an in camera proceeding may be used,22 and where a full trial type hearing
would impose a financial or administrative burden on the school
system, a simplified procedure may be sufficient.2 3 Furthermore, several factors make the individual teacher's arguments
especially persuasive. The interest in protecting academic freedom weighs strongly in favor of a hearing, and the difficulty
in securing employment during the school term when most
teachers are hired for a full school year make midyear termination especially onerous.
The decision in Cooley successfully protects the interests involved. The only question with respect to the handling of dismissal cases within the Eighth Circuit is the effect of Roth upon
the future determinations of the court. Since Roth rejected the
use of the balancing test unless a liberty or property right is
found, the court might apply another mode of analysis to reach
the same result. Although a court could rely upon a right to
teach or a right to employment to find a "liberty" or "property"
interest, these theories have gained only limited judicial support.
It is more likely that under the particular circumstances of a
mid-term dismissal, the court would distinguish Roth as a yearend dismissal case and find a protected "property" interest in
the form of a contract right Therefore, it does not appear that
Roth will be a substantial obstacle in other mid-term dismissal
cases.

20. See Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1185 (lst
Cir. 1970); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and
Professors,70 D='n L.J. 841, 858 (1970).

21. Cooley v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 282, 287 (8th Cir. 1972).
22. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAiv.
L. Rsv. 1045, 1082 (1968).

23. See Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1185
(lst Cir. 1970).
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Constitutional Law: State Employees' Cause of Action
Under Fair Labor Standards Act Barred
By Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff employees of several state hospitals and correctional schools had never been paid overtime compensation. Although the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),' did not
originally cover state employees, the Act was amended in 1966
to include them in its coverage. 2 However, when the employees
sued the Missouri Department of Public Health and Welfare for
unpaid overtime, the suit was dismissed by the federal district
court. The Eighth Circuit affirmed and, in denying plaintiffs
the right to sue for unpaid overtime, held that Missouri had not
waived its defense of sovereign immunity by continuing to operate its hospitals and training schools subsequent to the adoption of the 1966 amendment to the FLSA. To resolve the conflict between the instant case and a similar one in which the
Tenth Circuit held that the employees did have a cause of action,3 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Employees of the
Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public
Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405
U.S. 1016 (1972).
The central issue presented is whether the state employees'
right of action, created by federal legislation enacted under the
commerce clause, survives when it clashes directly with the
state's immunity from suit in federal court by its own citizens.
Such immunity is usually held to arise under the eleventh
amendment, 4 although it is also said to be based on common
law.5 If only a common law immunity is involved, Congress
clearly has the power to carve out exceptions to the doctrine.
In the Employees case, however, the court treated the defense of
sovereign immunity as one of constitutional dimensions.
The eleventh amendment expressly prohibits federal courts
only from hearing a suit against a state by a citizen of another
1. Ch. 676, §§ 3(d), 7(a) (1), 52 Stat. 1060, 1063.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 207(a) (1) (1970). The amendment was
held constitutional in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
3. Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.), rev'g 301 F. Supp.
1023 (D. Utah 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).

4. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Monaco v. Mis-

sissippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

5. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1890).
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state, but in Hans v. Louisiana the Supreme Court held that an
individual plaintiff could not sue his own state because of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Although Hans is generally
read as extending the eleventh amendment's bar to include suits
against a state by one of its own citizens, 7 the state's immunity
from such suits has also been said to be based upon common
law.8 In addition, sovereign immunity has been thought to radiate 9from "the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution."
In the Employees case, the court did not rely on any one
theory. Instead it concluded that:
[A] state is immune from a suit brought against it by its
citizens on the basis of a reasonable interpretation of the original
Constitution and additionally upon the basis of the Eleventh
Amendment.' 0
Moreover, the court reasoned that:
To the extent that any inconsistency exists between the powers
granted by the Commerce Clause and the Eleventh Amendmore recent expression
ment, the Eleventh Amendment as the
of the will of the people should prevail.11
This conclusion, which assumes that the eleventh amendment applies to the situation even though suits against a state by its own
citizens are not expressly encompassed within the language of
that amendment, 1 2 appears clearly correct in light of Hans.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the defense of sovereign immunity should be abolished or strictly limited. A state
can commit wrongs as easily as a private individual. Moreover,
it is in a good position to spread the risk of loss to compensate
those who are injured by its operation. Nevertheless, in light of
Hans, courts will be ill-disposed to dispense with the defense
of sovereign immunity without further guidance from the Supreme Court.
Even where sovereign immunity exists, the question arises
whether the state may be said to have waived the defense. Such
6. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965);
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945);
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908); Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590,
591 (1904).
8. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1890). See also The
Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152,154 (1868).
9. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934); Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25-26
(1933); Ex parte State of New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
10. 452 F.2d at 823.
11. Id. at 825.
12. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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a waiver may be implied. In Parden v. Terminal Ry., 13 for example, Alabama had undertaken operation of a railroad, an area
clearly covered by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Parden
held the state subject to suit on the theory that the state's undertaking of the railroad business amounted to an implied waiver
of sovereign immunity. In this context, "waiver" is a somewhat
fictionalized device, and Parden can be interpreted as suggesting
that states ought to be subject to suit upon a cause of action
based on rights expressly created by Congress.
The majority in Employees sought to distinguish Parden on
several grounds. The court reasoned that if the private right
of action in Parden had been denied there would have been no
other remedies, whereas in the situation presented by Employees
the Secretary of Labor might have brought suit 14 or the employees could have sought injunctive relief against the state officials in their individual capacities.'5 The court also emphasized
that the remedy sought in Parden did not include double damages as did the remedy sought in the instant case. Moreover,
Parden involved a proprietary rather than a governmental function, since in undertaking operation of a railroad the state placed
itself in a position analogous to that of a private enterprise. Finally, the court noted that the state activity sought to be regulated in Parden was initiated after the appropriate legislation
was in effect, while in the instant case the hospitals were in operation long before the FLSA was made applicable to them.
On the other hand, the dissenting opinion concluded that
Parden was squarely in point, and would have held that there
had been an implied waiver.'" The dissent argued that the other
remedies available to plaintiffs were illusory and that double
damages were entirely within the trial court's discretion, and
unlikely to be awarded in the present case. Furthermore, the
dissent contended, the governmental-proprietary dichotomy has
never been recognized as significant in the cases 17 and Missouri
13. Id.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217 (1970).
15. As the court noted, "[s]uits by state employees for injunctive
relief may be available against state officials in their individual capacities under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 .... " 452 F.2d at 826.
16. 452 F.2d at 830-32.
17. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 182, 189 (1968), the Supreme
Court noted:
[I]t is clear that the Federal Government, when acting
within a delegated power, may override countervailing state
interests whether these be described as "governmental" or
"proprietary" in character.
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continued operating the hospitals after the 1966 amendment with
full knowledge of the applicability of the FLSA.
Perhaps the most plausible policy considerations supporting
the holding reached by the majority are those underlying its
attempt to distinguish governmental from proprietary functions.
The court was clearly concerned about federal impediments to
the state's ability to carry out essential governmental functions,
the argument being that the increased costs necessitated by federal legislation might lead to the curtailment or termination of
essential state services."' There is certainly room for concern
that no private enterprise would step in to operate hospitals and
correctional schools. On the other hand, the court's suggestion
that Missouri would simply terminate such facilities is somewhat unrealistic.' 9 To meet the requirements of the FLSA, the
state might have to curtail services, raise taxes, or divert money
from other programs to meet the increased costs. 2 0

Of course,

it is also possible that a state would have to decrease staff at
some institutions in order to pay the remaining staff more adequately, but it is at least arguable that the improved pay might
then attract more competent employees and partially offset the
effects of the smaller staff.
Although the advisability of federal wage and hour legislation may be disputed, the constitutionality of such legislation
has been specifically upheld, even as applied to state employees.21 Yet, the Eighth Circuit's decision in Employees leads to
an awkward result. State employees have a right to be paid
overtime compensation, but they have no private cause of action to enforce their claims. This conflict will presumably be
rectified by the Supreme Court's review of the Employees deci22
sion.

18. 452 F.2d at 826.
19.

Id.

20. In fact, Missouri has now begun to pay overtime, and it ap-

pears that the state will have to pay it retroactively as well. Hodgson
v. Missouri, 340 F. Supp. 1188 (1972).
21.
22.

Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
In Hodgson v. Missouri, 340 F. Supp. 1188 (1972), it was held

that the Secretary of Labor could properly maintain an action for an
order restraining the state from continuing to withhold unpaid overtime due from past work, but injunctive relief against future violations
was denied, since the state had begun to pay overtime wages and there
was no reason to suspect further violations. Although sovereign immunity was not involved in this case, it would seem to come close to
making appeal in Employees moot.
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Criminal Law: Affirmative Moral Beliefs Legally
Insufficient to Establish Defense
Of Necessity or Justification
Defendants were arrested while illegally removing draft
registration cards from a Selective Service office. The F.B.I. had
been informed in advance of the break-in, which was intended
to protest the Vietnam war, and its agents apprehended defendants in the office. At trial, defendants admitted their intent to
willfully hinder and interfere with the administration of the Selective Service Act' and were convicted of that crime. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that
affirmative moral beliefs which "compel" one to commit criminal
acts premised on those beliefs are legally insufficient to establish the defenses of justification and necessity. United States v.
Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972).
Defendants in Kroncke advanced two discrete but closely related defenses, 2 that of necessity or compulsion and that of justifiable civil disobedience. The latter defense involves the longstanding philosophical question of whether one who finds a law
morally repugnant is legally or ethically justified in violating
that law. This controversy has most recently stirred public debate in the United States in the areas of civil rights and antiwar
protest. Although philosophers have condoned and even praised
civil disobedience premised on moral conviction, they have also
suggested that those who practice civil3 disobedience must accept
the legal consequences of their actions.
The Kroncke court accepted this resolution of the issue and
rejected defendants' contention that the dictates of conscience
constitute a valid defense to criminal activity. That is, the moral
precepts held by defendants, which were antagonistic to the
purpose and effect of the Selective Service Act and to the conduct
of the war in Indochina, could not legally excuse their admit1. Military Selective Service Act, § 1 et seq., 50 U.S.C.A. App.

§ 451 et seq.

2. Several other defenses advanced by defendants were summarily disposed of by the court, including the alleged unconstitutionality
of the Vietnam war, the unconstitutional operation of the Selective
Service system in drafting men for the war, and first amendment
protection for at least one defendant whose criminal acts were religious
in nature.
3. See, e.g., M.L. KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 18-19, 31 (1964);
and H.D. THOREAU, Cim DIsOBE-nENcE 3, 17 (1969).
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tedly willful interference with that Act.4 The court's rejection
of the defense of justifiable civil disobedience seems clearly appropriate. As the court noted:
[Slociety cannot tolerate the means they [defendants] chose to
register their opposition to the war.
...

[O]ur democratic society is fragile,

...

there are broad

opportunities for peaceful and legal dissent, . . . the power of
the ballot, if used, is great. Peaceful and constant progress under the Constitution remains .

.

. the best hope for a just so-

ciety. 5
The second defense advanced in Kroncke, that of necessity or
compulsion, was similarly founded upon defendants' fundamental belief in the immorality of the Vietnam war. This defense, as propounded by defendants, posits certain moral imperatives which in essence deprived them of free choice and compelled them to violate the law.6 It thus is distinguishable from
their asserted defense of justified civil disobedience, which assumes freely-determined action.
The defense of necessity has long been recognized in the
criminal law. It has been explained as follows:
The pressure of natural physical forces sometimes confronts
a person in an emergency with a choice of two evils: either he
may violate the literal terms of the criminal law and thus produce a harmful result, or he may comply with those terms and
thus produce a greater or equal or lesser amount of harm. For
reasons of social policy, if the harm which will result from
compliance with the law is greater than that which will result
from violation of it, he is justified in violating it. Under such
circumstances he is said to have the defense of necessity, and
he is not guilty of the crime in question ....

7

4. 459 F.2d at 704.
5. Id. The court also relied on United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cart. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970), in which a similar
"justification" theory was advanced by the Berrigan brothers as a
defense to their prosecution for destruction of public records and interference with the administration of the Selective Service Act In
Moylan, the proffered defense of justification was rejected on essentially the same grounds as in Kroncke:
To encourage individuals to make their own determination as to which laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite
chaos. No legal system could long survive if it gave every individual the option of disregarding with impunity any law
which by his personal standard was judged morally untenable.
Toleration of such conduct would not be democratic, ...

but

inevitably anarchic.
417 F.2d at 1009.
6. One defendant in particular
asserted at trial that he was compelled by his religious convictions to perform the act in order to bring the evils of the
Vietnam War to the attention of the public and Congress.
459 F.2d at 699 (emphasis added).
7. W. LAFAvE, HANDBOOK ON CRnnNAL LAW 381 (1972) (hereinafter
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The defense of necessity typically includes three basic elements:"
(1) the harm avoided must in fact be greater than the harm
which would result from compliance with the law;9 (2) the action taken must cause the least possible harm, and any other alternative, whether lawful or unlawful, which would cause a
lesser harm than the alternative chosen will make the defense
unavailable; and finally (3) the defendant must have acted with
the intention of avoiding the greater harm. A fourth requirement, that the action taken must occur in the context of imminent peril, is also sometimes mentioned by the courts.10 This
requirement of immediate danger might simply mean that until
the threatened harm is imminent, defendant generally will have
other, lawful, options available."
Prior cases on the necessity defense, including those cited
to the court by defendants, involved situations clearly distinguishable, both in kind and degree, from Kroncke. Generally,
the pressures which caused defendants to violate the law in previous cases were the result of either natural physical forces or
actions by other persons, 1 2 rather than abstract notions of morality or religious convictions. Moreover, in those cases which allowed the defense, the threatened danger posed a greater and
more immediate consequence to the defendant personally.
For example, in The William Gray,13 a ship violated federal
embargo laws when it entered a foreign harbor to seek refuge
from a severe storm which threatened the safety of the vessel, its
crew and cargo. A libel action against the ship was unsuccessful on the basis that the defense of necessity was applicable. A
more common situation is that in which defendant argues that
coercion by another person compelled his criminal conduct. For
cited as LAFAVE). Where the pressure which caused defendant to violate the criminal law is exerted by other humans rather than natural
physical forces, the defense is more properly termed "duress." However, the essential elements of each are the same and the defenses of
duress and necessity may correctly be viewed simply as subcategories
of a more general defense called "justification" or "excuse."
8. See LAFAvE at 385-88.

Id.

9. The determination of the relative harmfulness of the available alternative courses of action necessarily is made by the court
rather than the defendant. LAFAVE at 386.
10.

See United States v. Palmer, 458 F.2d 663, 665 (9th Cir. 1072);

D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 358 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 343
U.S. 935, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 958, rehearing denied, 345 U.S. 931,
rehearingdenied, 203 F.2d 390 (1952).
11. See LAFAVE at 388. See also R.I. Recreation Center v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949).

12. See note 7 supra.
13.

29 F. Cas. 1300 (No. 17,694) (C.C.N.Y. 1810).
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example, in D'Aquino v. United States,1 4 a Japanese-American
was convicted of treason for her work as a wartime radio announcer and script writer for the Japanese government. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that for treason to be excused under the necessity defense the defendant "must manifest a determination to resist commands and orders until such time as he is
5
In
faced with the alternative of immediate injury or death."'
6
Browning v. State,' the defendant had been lawfully driving his
car and only drove "recklessly" in an attempt to escape after
police officers ambushed him and began shooting. The court
reversed his conviction for reckless driving on the basis of the
necessity defense:
The person committing the crime must be a free agent,
and not subject to actual force at the time the act is done; ...
bona fide ... [acquiescense to compulsion] is a legitimate deWhatever it is necessary for a man to do to save his
fense ....
life is, in general to be considered as compelled.17
After reviewing the necessity cases, the Kroncke court concluded that the defense was inapplicable. The court noted that
the case law demonstrated that for the defense to operate a defendant must prove his action was necessary in order "to protect his life or health, or the life or health of others, from a direct and immediate peril . . . [and not merely] to effect a change
in governmental policies which, according to the actor, may in
turn result in a future saving of lives."' The court also felt that
even the Model Penal Code, which has a necessity defense
broader in scope than that of the case law, did not reach the defendants' situation. 19
The result in Kroncke, based on common law precedent,
seems to have been inescapable. First, defendants were not per14. 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951).
15. Id. at 359.
16. 31 Ala. App. 137, 13 So. 2d 54 (1943).
17. Id. at 56 (quoting with approval from Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5,
12 So. 2d 301, 302 (1892)).
18. 459 F.2d at 701.
19. A.L.L Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft (1962), § 3.02
provides:
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid
a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided
that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct
is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining
the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense
provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification
claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
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sonally threatened by any immediate peril. Second, there were
constitutionally protected alternatives to defendants' criminal
conduct which arguably would have been at least as effective
as their criminal acts, such as voting, petitioning the government
for redress and speaking against the war. Finally, moral imperatives have never been recognized in the cases as sufficient to
invoke the necessity defense.
Apart from precedent, there exist several persuasive arguments for rejecting the necessity defense in cases like Kroncke.
First, a complication particularly inherent in the war protest
area is the difficulty of proof by objective evidence of defendants' motive and the degree of coercion they actually experienced
because of their moral convictions. Second, the defense is considered inapplicable where preempted by a legislative determination that it should not obtain. 20 Arguably such a determination is implicit in the Selective Service Act.2' Third, defendants'
actions were, standing alone, largely ineffective in promoting
their avowed purpose. That is, in terms of the efficacy of defendants' criminal conduct, there existed only a highly attenuated relationship between that conduct and defendants' stated
purpose of ending the war in Vietnam. Finally, as the court
argued with respect to civil disobedience, a democratic society
cannot easily waive compliance with its laws and still expect to
preserve an ordered system of law and government. Kroncke
thus constitutes persuasive precedent for the proposition that
affirmative moral beliefs alone cannot excuse conduct that violates the criminal law.

Criminal Law: Model Penal Code Standard of Insanity
Adopted by Eighth Circuit
Defendant was charged with three counts of assault. He
had previously been confined in mental institutions on several
occasions for long periods and each time was diagnosed as a
chronic paranoid schizophrenic. At his last discharge, a psy20. See LAFAVE at 382.
(c) in note 19 supra.

See also Model Penal Code section 3.02(1)

21. On this issue, the Kroncke court simply stated that:
We hesitate to say that Congress did not intend the statute to
be applied to those who violated it for the express purpose of
challenging our nation's foreign policies.
459 F.2d at 701.
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chiatrist recommended that long term hospitalization be considered and that he continue the use of a major tranquilizer. At
trial the defendant raised the defense of insanity. The trial
court instructed the jury on the traditional M'Naghten rule supplemented by the irresistible impulse test.' The jury returned
a verdict of guilty on all three counts.2 On appeal, the court
reversed and ordered a retrial in which the defendant's plea of
insanity was to be determined under the Model Penal Code instuction. 3 United States v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1972).
The premise of the M'Naghten rule is that the ability of a
person to conform to the law is governed exclusively by his
mental capacity to discern right from wrong. 4 It has been said
that this approach views the mind as composed of separate, individual compartments, and assumes that the capability of one
part of the mind to discern right from wrong is uninfluenced by
the condition of other parts of the mind.5 In rejecting the
M'Naghten-irresistible impulse standard, the Eighth Circuit has
joined in the nearly unanimous repudiation of the rule by the
federal courts of appeal" in favor of the Model Penal Code instruction.
The movement away from M'Naghten is based on the belief
that the defendant's cognitive ability to distinguish right from
wrong should not be the exclusive basis for determining criminal
1. First, that at the time of the commission of the offense
charged, the defendant had the mental capacity and reason to
distinguish between right and wrong as to each of the three offenses charged. Second, that at the time of the commission of
the offense charged, the defendant had sufficient mental
capacity and reason to understand the nature and character
thereof, and the consequences of such offense. Third, that he
did not commit the offense charged by reason of uncontrollable or irresistible impulse.

United States v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911, 913-14 (8th Cir. 1972).

2. 458 F.2d at 912.

3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Final Draft 1962), cited in 458 F.2d
918 (1972).

4. See note 1 supra.
5.

United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 766 (3d Cir. 1961).

6. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wade
v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States,

407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920
(4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968);

United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d
420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); United States v.
Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). The First Circuit Court of Ap-

peals is an exception.

About thirty states still retain the M'Naghten

rule as the sole test of insanity as a criminal defense.
& J. GOLDsTEN, CReME, LAw An SocIETY (1971).

A. GoLDsMW
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responsibility. 7 The Frazier court recognized that a defendant's
ability to control his behavior is a necessary factor in determining criminal responsibility8 and suggested that a lack of selfcontrol negates the existence of the necessary mens rea to constitute the act a crime.0 In this regard, the court's ultimate concern was that the attachment of criminal responsibility to the
behavior of those who cannot control their acts precludes those
defendants from receiving proper treatment for their mental condition.1 0 Upon release from penal confinement such persons still
lack an ability to control their behavior and remain a danger to
the public.
The court rejected the supplementary irresistible impulse
standard1" as a proper measure of a person's ability to control
himself.1 2 The supplementary standard refers only to momentary and spontaneous acts in determining the actor's lack of control. The fact that violent misconduct resulting from sustained
psychic compulsion occurs much more frequently than violent
misconduct from sudden, spontaneous actions demonstrates the
inadequacy of the standard.' 3 The court also objected to the
irresistible impulse standard because of its reliance on the concept of complete destruction of the defendant's will. The court
felt that to avoid this overly narrow and unrealistic concept the
criterion of substantial inability to control oneself should instead
be used.' 4 In contrast to the M'Naghten standard, section 4.01 of
the Model Penal Code provides:
(1) A defendant is insane within the meaning of these instructions if, at the time of the alleged criminal conduct, as a result
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to ap7. At the Annual Judicial Circuit of the United States, John
Biggs, Jr., Chief Judge of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, stated
that the M'Naghten formula is an irrelevancy, because asylums are
full of people who know right from wrong, but who are insane under
modern psychiatric standards. 37 F.R.D. 364, 380 (1964).
8. 458 F.2d at 916.
9. 458 F.2d at 914 n.l. See also United States v. Currens, 290
F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).

10. 458 F.2d at 916. It should be noted that the court thus assumes persons confined in mental institutions will receive psychiatric
treatment, while those confined in penal institutions will not. Although this assumption may be theoretically sound, it is questionable
whether the former necessarily or generally provides a significantly
superior therapeutic millieu.
11. See note 1 supra.
12. 458 F.2d at 916.
13. Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHi.
L. REV. 367, 393 (1957).

14.

458 F.2d at 917.
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preciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.

(2)

As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect"

do not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated

criminal or anti-social conduct
Although the Model Penal Code includes a right-wrong cognition test, it is in a form much different from that found in the
M'Naghten rule. Under this new test the ability to appreciate
the wrongfulness of conduct need only be substantially, not totally, impaired. In addition, the new standard provides a basis
for finding insanity independent of cognitive incapacity when
there is substantial inability to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law.
The second paragraph of the Model Penal Code section excludes abnormalities "manifested only by prior criminal or antisocial acts" from being considered a mental disease or defect
for the purpose of applying the test.1
This, in effect, does not
allow offenders whose mental condition has been manifested
only by prior criminal acts to be found insane. As a result, such
offenders are imprisoned, do not receive the treatment necessary to cure their condition and upon release, re-enter society
with the same inability to control their potentially criminal behavior.1'
Although these offenders may well be those from
whom society most needs protection, the paragraph two standard precludes such offenders from receiving treatment that
might cure their condition and ultimately alleviate the danger
they pose to the public. Consequently, a defect of the M'Naghten instruction sought to be cured in Frazier may be inadvertently perpetuated if the Model Penal Code standard is adopted
in its entirety.
The second paragraph of the Model Penal Code standard
has also been criticized on the ground that it discriminates
against those offenders who cannot afford the expense of a full
and complete psychiatric examination. 17 A skilled and interested psychiatrist is often required to discover the exculpatory
mental aberrations found in many habitual criminals. A courtappointed psychiatrist, the only one available to most offenders,
is generally unable to devote sufficient time to uncover these
15. Two circuit courts have rejected this aspect of the instruction.
Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968).
16. See generally Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir.
1970).
17. Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CAL.
L. REv.189 (1962).
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exculpating traits. The cost of the privately retained psychiatrist who will make an exhaustive diagnosis is prohibitive for
most criminal offenders.
A further problem arises because the new test requires the
existence of a "mental disease or defect" without adequately
defining the conditions that constitute mental disease or defect.
The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry has defined
mental disease as "an illness which so lessens the capacity of
a person to use his judgment, discretion, and control in the
conduct of his affairs and social relations as to warrant his commitment to a mental institution."1' 8 This definition does not resolve the problem, however, because it creates the need for a
measure of impairment to the conduct of affairs and social relations.
The absence of standards to guide the trier of fact may leave
it free to decide the issue by an intuitive judgment. That result
may be deemed adequate by those who feel that criminal law
need only reflect the societal sense of justice. But the absence
of standards may also mean that the fortuity of personalities
which compose a jury will determine when the defense is valid
and when it is not. It can be argued that a definition should be
supplied by a psychiatrist who participates in the trial as an
expert witness. However, his definition would be more likely to
accord with medical principles than with the supposed legislative policies underlying the test. Moreover, this procedure might
simply have the effect of replacing the intuitive judgment of the
trier of fact with that of the expert. The expert could bring
the defendant within the ambit of the defense merely by labeling his behavioral disorder as a mental disease.' 9 Although the
Model Penal Code standard provides a more flexible and realistic approach to the insanity defense, its failure to deal with the
factors discussed above points to the need for further legislative or judicial refinement.

18. GAP REPORT No. 26, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHIATRIC
EXPERT TESTIMONY 8 (1954).

19. In Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the
expert witness had testified at trial that sociopathy was merely a per-

sonality disturbance and not a mental disease. Subsequently, the staff
at St. Elizabeth's hospital relabeled sociopathy as a mental disease.
As a consequence, the trial court ordered a new trial. See generally
Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. Rzv. 789, 833
(1967).
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Criminal Procedure: Admissibility of Videotape
Recording of Confession Upheld
Defendant was charged with first degree murder. Among
the evidence presented in support of the state's case was a videotape recording of his confession to police officers and the prosecuting attorney. After a hearing outside the presence of the
jury, the trial court ruled the tape admissible. Subsequently,
defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. After the Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction and sentence,' he petitioned in federal
district court for a writ of habeas corpus. In an unreported
opinion, the writ was denied without a hearing. Defendant appealed to the Eighth Circuit, primarily on the ground that the
trial court erroneously admitted the videotape recording of his
confession, 2 thereby depriving him of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The court affirmed the denial of the
writ of habeas corpus, one judge dissenting,3 concluding that
videotaped confessions were actually an advancement in the
field of criminal procedure that protected the rights of the accused. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972).
When motion pictures were a relative novelty, courts were
reluctant to admit them into evidence. Several early decisions
based their objections on the ground that the admission of motion pictures into evidence violated the established rules of evidence, even though the relevancy and authenticity of the pictures were clearly established. Thus, in Feeney v. Young 4 the
trial court refused to admit a motion picture on the ground that
it was not the best evidence available. Similarly, in Gibson v.
1. State v. Hendricks, 456 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1970).
2. Appellant also claimed that (1) the state had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the crime, and
(2) his statements and confession to the police were the product of mental and physical coercion. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 504 (8th
Cir. 1972). In rejecting these contentions, the court did not deal with
them at length. Id. at 504-05.
3. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 507-08 (8th Cir. 1972)
(Heaney, J., dissenting). Judge Heaney stated that although he felt the
oral and videotaped statements were not freely and voluntarily given,
even if the confession was voluntary, he would have still ruled the
videotaped statement inadmissible because (1) it was not a faithful reproduction of the entire transaction, and (2) there was no showing that
Hendricks fully understood the implications of the use of his videotaped confession.
4. 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (1920).
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Gunn,5 motion pictures were characterized as hearsay evidence,
and therefore incompetent and inadmissible. In Pandolfo v.
United States,6 the trial court was sustained in refusing to admit
a motion picture which defendant offered to exhibit to the jury,
the reviewing court stating that "the question of permitting the
moving picture to be displayed before the jury was so far within
the discretion of the court that while it might not have been
error to have received it, it was not error to exclude it."
However, in 1930 the restrictive trend toward refusing to
admit motion pictures into evidence was reversed in Commonwealth v. Roller.8 In that case, the defendant was indicted for
larceny. After his arrest, his confession to various burglaries
was recorded by a "talking motion picture machine." The film
of the confession was offered into evidence and admitted by the
trial court over the defendant's objection. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court sustained the decision of the trial court,
holding that the film was sufficiently authenticated to make it
admissible in evidence. 9 Concerning the general admissibility of
motion pictures into evidence, the court noted that
the movietone is . . . in basic characteristics, no different, on
the one hand, from ordinary photography, in regard to the
visual picture reproduced, and, on the other hand, from phonographic records, in regard to the auditory recording of sound.
The principles that underlie their admissibility into evidence,
therefore, differ in no way from those governing the admissibility of still pictures and phonographic records.10
There is virtually universal accord that, once a proper foun-

dation is laid for a sound recording" or a photograph,'1 2 it may
5. 206 App. Div. 464, 202 N.Y.S. 19 (1923).
6. 286 F. 8 (7th Cir. 1922).
7. Id. at 16. A similar result was reached in De Camp v. United
States, 10 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1925), where it was held that it was for the
trial court to determine whether the motion picture offered into evidence was sufficiently verified to be admitted.
8. 100 Pa. Super. 125 (1930).
9. Id. at 131.
10. Id. at 127.
11. See generally Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956); Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 838 (1951); Gillars v. United States,

182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See People v. MacKenzie, 144 Cal. App.
2d 100, 300 P.2d 700 (1956); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Stossell, 131 Fla. 127,
179 S. 163 (1938); Steve M. Soloman Jr., Inc. v. Edgar, 92 Ga. App. 207,
88 S.E.2d 167 (1955); Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 134 N.E.2d 249
(1956); Sutton v. State, 273 Ind. 305, 145 N.E.2d 425 (1957); State v. Triplett, 248 Iowa 339, 79 N.W.2d 391 (1956); State v. Alleman, 218 La. 821,
51 So. 2d 83 (1950).
12. See Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513, 8 A.L.R. 1034 (1919);
Baston v. Shelton, 152 Fla. 879, 13 So. 2d 453 (1943); Mardorff v. State,
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be placed in evidence. On the rationale that motion pictures or
videotapes are merely an elaborate combination of the two, they
too should be admitted. Therefore, many courts in criminal trials admit a motion picture or videotape of the defendant's confession,' 3 re-enactment of the crime 4 or of behavior during or
following the crime.' 5 Many of the original objections to the
admission of motion pictures have been rejected. A motion picture has been held not to be subject to the objection that it was
hearsay' 6 or that it violated the best evidence rule" or that it
was secondary evidence.'3 Moreover, the exclusion of motion
pictures which were properly authenticated and relevant has
been held, at least in civil cases, to be an abuse of discretion and
reversible error.19
The widespread acceptance by the judiciary of motion pictures as evidence, in both civil and criminal trials, has resulted
in a much larger use of film in criminal cases to record defendants' confessions, re-enactments of the crime and behavior during booking. In People v. Hayes,2 0 for example, a motion picture
of defendant's confession was received in evidence despite the
defendant's objections that the admission of the picture denied
him the right to confront in court the witnesses against him,
the right to cross-examine the witnesses who testified against
him and the right against self-incrimination. The reviewing
court upheld the trial court's decision, stating that a motion
picture of the confession "stands on the same basis as the presentation . . . of a confession through any orthodox mechanical
medium .... "21 In People v. Dabb22 the admission into evi143 Fla. 64, 196 So. 625 (1950); Gibson v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 582, 223
See generally, 1 C. ScoTr, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE §
41 (1969).

S.W.2d 625 (1949).
13.

People v. Hayes, 21 Cal. App. 2d 320, 71

P.2d 321 (1937);

Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969); State v. Hall, 253 La. 425,
218 So. 2d 320 (1969).
14. People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 197 P.2d 1 (1948); Grant v.
State, 171 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1965).

15. State v. Strickland, 276 N.C. 253, 173 S.E.2d 129 (1970); Housewright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1949).
16. Richardson v. Missouri-K.-T. R.R., 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947).
17. International Union, USS & AIW v. Russell, 264 Ala. 456, 88
So. 2d 175, 62 A.L.R.2d 669 (1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
18. McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 1L. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940).
19. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 190 Miss. 53, 199 So. 289
(1940); Boyarski v. G.A. Zimmerman Corp., 240 App. Div. 361, 270
N.Y.S. 134 (1934).

20. 21 Cal. App. 2d 320, 71 P.2d 321 (1937).
21. Id. at 321, 71 P.2d at 322. Accord, Paramore v. State, 229 So.
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dence of a motion picture depicting the artificial re-enactment
of the crime by the defendants was upheld. While the court recognized that "the artificial re-creation of an event may unduly
accentuate certain phases of the happening, ' 23 it concluded that
"when the events . . . photographed consist of a voluntary reenactment by the accused . . . there is little, if any, danger of
25
And in Housewright v. State,
*."..24
misleading emphasis .
a motion picture of the defendant's behavior after his arrest for
driving while intoxicated was admitted into evidence even
though the defendant clearly did not consent to the taking of the
26
motion picture.
The above cases provide abundant precedent for the majority position in Hendricks that a videotaped recording of the defendant's confession is admissible into evidence. However, these
cases failed to recognize all of the conflicting policy questions
present when a motion picture or videotape of the defendant's
confession or re-enactment of the crime or behavior during ar2
rest is offered into evidence. 7
First, it must be remembered that determining whether a
motion picture or videotape of a defendant's confession should
be admitted into evidence is not the same as deciding whether
the confession itself should be admitted. Clearly other means
of presenting the confession are available, e.g., a sound recording, a written statement, or the testimony of witnesses. Therefore, before a film of the confession is accepted into evidence,
there should be a demonstration that a motion picture or videotape presentation of the confession promotes justice better than,
or at least as well as, these other means of presentation.
The main argument raised in support of the majority position
in Hendricks is that the videotape, by presenting a more "complete" picture of the facts surrounding the confession, protects
the rights of the accused. Thus, the majority stated:
[A] video tape is protection for the accused. If he is hesitant, uncertain or faltering, such facts will appear. If he has
been worn out by interrogation, physically abused, or in other
2d 855 (Fla. 1969); State v. Hall, 253 La. 425, 218 So. 2d 320 (1969);
State v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1970).
22. 32 Cal. 2d 491, 197 P.2d 1 (1948).

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
holding
analyze

Id. at 495, 197 P.2d at 5.
Id. Accord, Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1965).
See cases cited in note 15 supra.
Housewright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1949).
According to Judge Heany, dissenting in Hendricks, "the cases
that videotaped confessions are admissible failed to sufficiently
the problems presented." 456 F.2d at 508.
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respects is acting involuntarily, the tape will corroborate him in
ways a typewritten statement would not. Instead of denying
a defendant his rights, we 28
believe it is a modern technique to
protect a defendant's rights.

Several factors not discussed by the majority opinion render
this conclusion somewhat doubtful First, under Hendricks there
is no requirement that all confessions be videotaped. This permits the police to decide when to use that means of recording
the confession and to present only the "good shows" to the jury.
Second, as Judge Heaney noted in his dissent, 20 since Hendricks
does not require that the entire transaction between the police
and the defendant be videotaped, the police may choose what
portion of the interrogation to videotape. Third, the police photographer who films the confession will have a great deal of discretion in determining how the confession should be videotaped.
It is not too extreme to assume that the photographer may select
the most dramatic and emotional portrayal of the confession. In
his treatise on photographic evidence Scott advises police photographers:
The motion picture of a confession should show not only
the party making the confession but also the officers who are
present. A zoom lens will be helpful because by its use the
confession can start out showing all parties present and then
zoom in to a close-up of the person who is confessing. Here as
always, however, do not make too much use of the variable potentialities
of the zoom lens for overuse is annoying and dis30
tracting.

Moreover, as Judge Heaney stated, the defendant has probably never seen himself on television and, as a result, has no
way of evaluating how he will look and what the impact of his
appearance, demeanor, and mannerisms will be. 3' In all probability, "the videotape will tend to make the defendant look
'rougher' than he is in the flesh. The videotape camera will
emphasize scars, blemishes, or a heavy beard....

The... cam-

era will pick out and magnify unpleasant mannerisms."3 2 Thus,
it is virtually impossible for a defendant to make a knowing
waiver of his rights when he consents to a videotaped confession.

But perhaps the most persuasive objection to videotaped
confessions is that "a videotaped confession is ... a totally differ28.
29.
30.
ded).
31.
32.

Id. at 506.
Id. at 508.
2 C. Scor, PHOTOGRAP.mc EvmmECE § 727 (1969) (emphasis ad456 F.2d at 509.
Id. at 508.
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ent form of communication which requires different sensory responses . . . . 33 Judge Heaney elaborated further on the differences between film communication and other means of communication by quoting extensively from the work of Marshall
McLuhan. 3 4 A shorthand interpretation of both Judge Heaney's
comments and McLuhan's description of the medium is that a
film presentation of a confession has a much more powerful emotional impact on the jury than other means of presentation. In
another context, the Wisconsin Supreme Court criticized the
admission of a motion picture into evidence:
Doubtless the show was highly entertaining to the jury, but
entertainment of the jury is no function of a trial. And why all
this fuss to prove a fact susceptible of easy, exact and undisputable demonstration. .. ?3
The reason for "all this fuss" over the admission of motion
pictures is that a filmed reproduction of an event is the best
available means of emotionally influencing a jury as to the facts
surrounding that event. Thus, the prosecution's unstated reason for desiring to use videotaped confessions becomes clear.
However, in the context of Hendricks, this added emotional impact may be achieved only at the expense of defendant's constitutional rights.
Because of this strong appeal to the senses and the quality
of "liveness" in a videotaped confession ....
the use of such a
confession comes dangerously close to requiring the defendant
to incriminate himself. In terms of effect upon the jury, the
playing of a defendant's videotaped confession at trial is the
functional equivalent 36
of requiring him to take the stand and
testify against himself.
On the other hand, with the proper safeguards, the admission of videotaped confessions into evidence could be constitutionally permissible. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Heaney
suggested three minimal standards videotaped confessions
should satisfy before they can properly be admitted. Those
standards are (1) that the entire transaction between the police
and the defendant, including all interrogations, be videotaped;
(2) that the defendant be advised of his constitutional rights in
accordance with Miranda and also be thoroughly advised of the
use to be made of the videotaped interrogation, and these warnings also be videotaped; (3) that the defendant be given a copy
33. Id.
Id. at 508-09, quoting M. McLUHAN, THE MEDIUM IS THE MAS125-28 (1967).
35. Hadrian v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & Transp. Co., 241 Wis. 122, 125,
1 N.W.2d 755, 759 (1942).
36. 456 F.2d at 509.
34.

SAGE
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of the videotaped confessions to be retained by him until his appellate remedies are exhausted. 37 Two further requirements
might also be suggested. The conditions surrounding the filming of the confession, such as lighting, the speed of the camera,
the use of close-up, should be strictly scrutinized and regulated.
Further, unless the police in the jurisdiction in question habitually film confessions, the prosecution should be required to explain why the confession in the case at hand was chosen to be
38
filmed.
All of these requirements protect the constitutional rights
of the accused by reducing the opportunity for police "discretion" in the use of videotaped statements. If they are met, videotaped confessions might be correctly described as "an advancement in the field of criminal procedure."30 However, if they
are not complied with, the benefits gained from using videotaped
confessions do not justify the possible invasion of constitutional
rights.

Criminal Procedure: Warning of Fourth Amendment
Rights Necessary Prior to In-Custody Request for

Handwriting Exemplars, But Unneeded if Not In-Custody
In two actions consolidated for appeal, the Eighth Circuit
dealt with the question of the admissibility of handwriting exemplars taken without prior warning of fourth amendment or
Miranda rights. United States v. Harris involved an exemplar
taken from a juvenile in his home in the presence of his parents.
In United States v. Long, the defendant voluntarily provided
an exemplar while in custody. In each case, the trial court suppressed the exemplar evidence. The Eighth Circuit reversed in
Harris but affirmed in Long, holding that taking a handwriting
exemplar is a search and seizure within the fourth amendment
and as such requires a warrant absent valid consent. The court
further held that such consent is valid if given without a prior
warning of fourth amendment rights, absent a Miranda warning,
only if the defendant is not in custody. United States v. Harris,
453 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1972).
37. Id.
38. Another safeguard which would go even further in protecting
a defendant would be to require his written consent to use of the videotape after viewing it.
39. Id. at 506.
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The fourth amendment generally prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures and provides that warrants shall issue only
upon probable cause. With few exceptions, courts have held
warrantless searches unreasonable per se. 1 However, the constitutional protection against warrantless searches may be
waived by valid consent.
Even though a waiver of the right against self-incrimination
and the right to counsel by a defendant in custody requires a
prior warning,'2 the Supreme Court has never determined
whether a warning of fourth amendment rights must be given
prior to a warrantless search founded upon consent. The lower
courts have divided, but the majority rule is that no warning
of any kind is needed for a noncustodial 3 consent, and that a
Miranda warning, although not specifically apprising the defendant of his fourth amendment rights, is sufficient to validate
4
a consent given by a defendant in custody.
In the instant case, no warnings of any kind were given
prior to the taking of either exemplar, and thus the sufficiency of
a Miranda warning alone was not in issue. Rather, the court
determined the applicability of the fourth amendment to compelled handwriting exemplars, the need for a warrant, and the
extent to which fourth amendment rights can be waived without prior warning.
The court first held that the taking of handwriting exemplars is a search and seizure within the fourth amendment. The
court reasoned that a search is an examination of premises or
persons in an attempt to discover incriminating evidence. In
Schmerber v. California5 the Supreme Court held the taking of
blood samples to be within the fourth amendment. The Harris
court found the taking of handwriting exemplars to be analo1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1961).

2.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3. See Leeper v. United States, 446 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1971);
Harris v. Hendricks, 423 F.2d 1096 (3d Cir. 1970); Byrd v. Lane, 398 F.2d

158, 750 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1020 (1969). But see Perkins v. Henderson, 418 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Balock,
255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).

4. See United States v. Goosbey, 419 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970); Vir-

gin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396

U.S. 837 (1969); Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (lst Cir. 1967).
The principal rationale offered for justifying the sufficiency of a Miranda warning is that if the accused is warned of his fifth amendment
right to silence he knows he may remain silent. It is argued that
therefore he would know he need not give a consent.
5. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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gous, even though exemplars do not involve intrusions into the
defendant's body, since "the search is still for evidence of guilt,
the evidence must be obtained from the person of the suspect
himself, and it involves some intrusion into the privacy of the
'6
person."
In terms of the fourth amendment policy of protecting individual privacy,7 blood samples and handwriting exemplars
seem equally deserving of constitutional protection. Blood samples involve intrusions into the person of a defendant, but the
procedure is nevertheless a passive one. Handwriting exemplars,
though seemingly innocuous, require the active, willful cooperation of the defendant. In each case, a detention is a prerequisite
to obtaining the evidence, which in itself constitutes a "seizure"
within the fourth amendment protection. For both handwriting exemplars and blood samples, then, a warrant of some type
appears constitutionally required. Thus any significant distinction between blood samples and handwriting exemplars seems
more properly relevant to the quantum of evidence necessary to
procure a warrant for each procedure, rather than to their characterization as searches or seizures.8
Although the court did not discuss the quantum of evidence
issue, it did determine the procedural protections required by
the fourth amendment. Relying on Davis v. MississippiO and
Schmerber, the court held that absent a valid consent a reasonable "seizure" of handwriting samples requires a warrant. The
extraction of blood samples without a warrant was held constitutional in Schmerber because of the rapidity with which the
alcohol content in blood diminishes. This "special circumstance"
excepted the blood sample there taken from the warrant requirement because it would have been impossible to obtain a
warrant in time to make an effective blood-alcohol analysis.10
This factor, in conjunction with the relatively more serious nature of the intrusion, lessens the persuasiveness of the Schmerber analogy, even though Schmerber stated in dicta that absent
exigent circumstances a warrant would have been required.
Although handwriting exemplars appear more analogous to
fingerprint specimens, the reliance on Davis similarly appears
not entirely apposite. Petitioner in Davis was detained for fin6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

453 F.2d at 1320.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 756 (1966).
See text accompanying notes 13-15 infra.
394 U.S. 721 (1969).
384 U.S. at 770-71.
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gerprinting purposes during a mass roundup of suspects; his detention clearly was not supported by probable cause. The fingerprint evidence thus obtained was held inadmissible because of
the illegality of the detention itself rather than because of the
failure to obtain a warrant to authorize fingerprinting."I
Davis more persuasively argues for the proposition that procedures such as fingerprinting represent a special category for
fourth amendment purposes. While the Court there held the
particular detention illegal, it also suggested that detention for
fingerprinting might be permissible in "narrowly defined circumstances" even absent probable cause as traditionally defined
because fingerprinting:
involves none of the probing into an individual's private life
and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search. Nor can
fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harrass any
individual, since the police need only one set of each person's
prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-solving tool than identifications or confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper line-up
and the third degree. Finally, because there is no danger of deneed not come
struction of fingerprints, the limited detention
12
unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time.
The truly significant distinction in Davis, however, involves
not only this less than probable cause standard, but also the
type of "warrant" thought necessary to validate a seizure for
fingerprinting purposes. Although the Davis court would require prior judicial authorization for fingerprinting without exception, it rather carefully refrained from specifically requiring
that such authorization take the form of the traditional warrant.13 As a result of this suggestion, a new rule of federal
criminal procedure has been proposed that would allow the taking upon less than probable cause grounds of certain nontestimonial identification procedures, including fingerprints and
handwriting exemplars, pursuant to a court order enforceable
by the contempt sanction. 1 4 Indeed, a federal district court in
the Eighth Circuit has adopted this proposed rule expressly for
the purpose of obtaining handwriting exemplars upon less than
11. 394 U.S. at 728.
12. Id. at 727. Indeed, Justice Harlan suggested in his concurring
opinion that compelled fingerprinting without a warrant might be permissible in certain unspecified, exigent circumstances. Id. at 728-29.
13. Id.
14. Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.1, 52 F.R.D.
462 (1971). An extensive analysis of this rule is contained in Note,
Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.1, 56 MiNN. L. REv. 667

(1972).
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probable cause grounds.Y5 It remains open to question, however,
whether this suggested procedure will satisfy the criteria set
forth in Davis or the warrant requirement of the instant case.
Since the Harriscourt determined that a warrant is required
for obtaining exemplars, the only possible basis for admitting
the exemplar evidence was that the defendants had waived their
fourth amendment rights by a valid consent. In determining the
validity of consent given prior to a warning of fourth amendment rights, the court reasoned by analogy to the rules for determining when a Miranda warning is required. A Miranda
warning is required only if the defendant is interrogated while
in custody, since the presumption that interrogation is coerced
does not exist in the noncustodial situation. 0 Thus, the court
held that a fourth amendment warning is not required to validate an otherwise uncoerced, intelligent consent to the taking
of a handwriting exemplar given by a person not in custody.
Since the fifth amendment affords an absolute protection against
self-incrimination and the fourth amendment only protects
against unreasonablesearches, the Harris court's reasoning that
no stricter requirements are necessary for a valid waiver of
fourth amendment rights than for waiver of fifth amendment
rights seems correct.
The court also found the Miranda analogy persuasive with
respect to the need for a fourth amendment warning to a defendant in custody. On the basis of the Miranda rationale, the
court held that absent a warning of fourth amendment rights, an
in-custody consent is involuntary as a matter of law and thus
constitutionally invalid. Since no warrant was obtained in
Long, a valid consent in that case was necessary to preclude application of the exclusionary rule.' 7 Defendant Long's arrest
and incarceration in a local jail were based on a state warrant
15. The Federal District Court sitting in St. Paul, Minnesota,
adopted the following rule on December 13, 1971:
It is ordered that the magistrates at St. Paul and Minneapolis are authorized to issue orders requiring the furnishing of
handwriting exemplars under the terms and conditions specified in Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
This order apparently is still effective, notwithstanding the decision in
the instant cases. Interview with Clerk of Federal District Court, April
18, 1973.
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), held that evidence
which is the product of an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible in
federal prosecutions. This exclusionary rule was extended to state
prosecutions under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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procured by local police. But the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's determination that because federal agents accompanied the local police during the arrest, the defendant legally
was under federal detention as well. Since the federal government conceded the lack of probable cause to arrest and detain
defendant or to obtain a warrant, and since no fourth amendment warning was given, the exemplar evidence was held inadmissible.
Requiring a fourth amendment warning to validate an incustody consent seems desirable. Absent such a warning, the
defendant often might be in no position to make an intelligent
waiver of his fourth amendment rights. Moreover, the Miranda
analogy is persuasive since, as the Supreme Court has long recognized, "the fourth and fifth amendments run almost into each
other.' 8 Both amendments are intended to protect citizens
against arbitrary and coercive intrusions by the government into
their legitimate rights to privacy and personal security.19

Criminal Procedure: Wiretap Provisions of Omnibus
Crime Control Act Held to Meet Fourth
Amendment Requirements
Defendants were convicted in federal district court of conspiring to violate 21 U.S.C. sections 173 and 174, which proscribe
trafficking in a narcotic drug knowing it to have been illegally
18. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 639 (1886).
19. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). If the need for the
exemplar is related to the charge for which the defendant is formally
detained, however, the probable cause supporting such detention would
readily support a warrant for an exemplar. If a preliminary hearing
has already occurred, such that the arrest and detention are supported
by a magistrate's determination of probable cause, there seems less need
for judicial authorization for the exemplar or for a warning. Nevertheless, requiring such prior authorization would insure that procuring
such exemplars would be relevant, material, and necessary to the
prosecution of the alleged crime. As a practical matter, if an individual is detained with probable cause, a warrant to take an exem-

plar could easily be obtained.

If probable cause is lacking, however,

then under the exclusionary rule such evidence is inadmissible regardless of consent. Finally, it should be noted that concern with in-

custody consent is perhaps of little practical interest to the defendant
since even though the particular exemplar in dispute was held inadmissible, the court intimated that its decision would not bar admission
of exemplars later validly taken from the defendant. 453 F.2d at 132
n.3.
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imported. Much of the evidence admitted at trial against the
defendants was procured through the use of a wiretap authorized pursuant to the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control
Act of 1968.1 On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, defendants' main
contentions were that the wiretap was illegal and invalid because wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are inherently
unconstitutional and that even if wiretapping can be constitutionally effectuated, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act
does not contain the procedural safeguards necessary to achieve
such a result. The Eighth Circuit found that some forms of
eavesdropping are constitutional when accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards and that Title HI contained the
necessary safeguards. Therefore, the court held the wiretap in
question to be valid and affirmed the conviction. United States
v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972).
The fourth amendment guarantees the "right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures" 2 by providing that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."3 However, in deciding
the first wiretap case in 1928, the Supreme Court held that the
amendment applied only to tangible matter seized during an
actual physical trespass. 4 Later cases rejected the view that a
conversation passing over a telephone wire did not come within
the fourth amendment's enumeration of "persons, houses, papers, and effects" 5 but retained the doctrine that a wiretap could
not invade fourth amendment rights unless it was accompanied
by a physical trespass upon the person or property of the defendant. 6 In a series of cases decided since 1966, the Court fi1. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. II
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
2. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
3. Id.
4. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
5. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), conversations overheard by a "spike mike" were suppressed, thus explicitly establishing the proposition that conversations may be the subject of a
"search and seizure." The Court found it unnecessary, however, to reexamine the "trespass doctrine" since it found that the spike had penetrated the defendant's premises.
6. In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1941), the Court adhered to the trespass doctrine of Olmstead, ruling that the use of an
electronic "bugging" device could not be condemned where there was
no trespass upon the premises of the objecting party. Accord, Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952).
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nally rejected the artificial distinction between trespassing and
non-trespassing wiretaps and instead focused upon the procedural safeguards that must necessarily be present for a wiretap
to be constitutionally valid.

7

In Osborn v. United States,8 the Supreme Court affirmed a
conviction for attempted bribery of a member of the jury panel
in a prospective federal criminal trial. The conviction was based
on recorded conversations between the defendant and an individual cooperating with federal agents. The use of the electronic recording device had been authorized by two federal
judges. In holding that the use of the recording device was permissible and that the evidence was properly admitted, the Court
stressed two factors: that the use of the device was authorized
by federal judges in response to a detailed affidavit alleging the
commission of a specific criminal offense and that the recording
was made for "the narrow and particularized purpose" of determining the truth of the affidavit's allegationsY
In Berger v. New York, 10 the Supreme Court declared a
New York eavesdrop statute" unconstitutional on its face. The
statute permitted a judge to issue a warrant authorizing electronic surveillance for a period of up to four months upon the
oath of specified public officials that there was reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence of a crime may be obtained.
While the statute was held to satisfy the fourth amendment's
command that a neutral and detached authority be interposed
between the police and the public,' 2 the Court found it to be
fatally deficient in several other respects. The enumeration of
these deficiencies provides a check-list of requirements which
other eavesdrop statutes must satisfy to be found constitutional.
According to Berger, an order authorizing a wiretap must name,
if possible, the person whose communication is to be seized,
state the specific offense committed, particularly describe the
communication to be seized and provide that the search end
when the desired communication is seized. 13 The order must also
7. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
8. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).

9. Id. at 330. As the Court noted:
There could hardly be a clearer example of "the procedure of
antecedent justification before a magistrate that is central to
the Fourth Amendment" as "a precondition of lawful electronic
surveillance".
10. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
11.

N.Y. Laws 1967, ch. 681, § 86 (repealed 1968).

12. 388 U.S. at 54.
13.

Id. at 59, 60.
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be executed with dispatch and require a return on it, showing
the manner of execution and the materials seized. 14 Finally,
there must be a showing of exigent circumstances in order to
avoid the requirement of notice to the subject of the search. 5
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black expressed the fear that
these standards would create obstacles that would make the enactment of valid eavesdropping statutes by either the state or
federal governments impossible. The majority, however, refused
to allow the need for effective law enforcement to override the
requirements of the fourth amendment.
One year later, in Katz v. United States,' the Supreme Court
affirmed the Osborn and Berger rationales while overturning a
conviction obtained with the aid of evidence secured by an eavesdropping device fastened to the top of a telephone booth. Despite the lack of a warrant, the government contended that
probable cause and the limitation in the scope and duration of
the search resulted in sufficient compliance with constitutional
safeguards. While the Court recognized that the search was narrow enough so that a court, upon a showing of probable cause,
could have constitutionally authorized it,1 7 it considered the failure to obtain authorization by a judge a fatal defect.1 8 The
Court reasoned that no matter how carefully the police restrain
themselves, the judiciary must be interposed between the police
and the public for an interception to be valid. 19
In the instant case, the Eighth Circuit quickly dismissed
appellant's contention that wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are inherently unconstitutional, citing Osborn and
Katz for the proposition that some forms of eavesdropping are
constitutional when accompanied by appropriate procedural
safeguards.20 But more importantly, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the Osborn, Berger and Katz opinions provide the
basic framework and guidelines that any eavesdropping statute
must meet if it is to be found constitutional. The Eighth Circuit
has interpreted those opinions to require:
(1)

that the applicant procure "[from] a neutral and de-

tached authority" ... an order permitting the wiretap; (2)
that to procure the order ... the applicant must show probable
cause that an offense has been or is being committed and must
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. Id. at 353.

18. Id. at 354.
19. Id.
20. 462 F.2d at 1302.
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state with particularity (3) the offense being investigated, (4)
the place being searched . . . (5) the things (conversations)
to be seized; (6) that the order must be executed with dispatch;
(7) that it must not continue beyond the procurement of the
conversation sought . . . (8) that it overcome the lack of notice
by requiring a showing of exigent circumstances as a precondition 2to the order; and (9) that it require a return on the warrant. 1
The Eighth Circuit concluded that Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act met these requirements.2 2 A review of that
statute indicates that this conclusion is probably correct.
Title III represents the first comprehensive federal legislation in the area of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Its
dual purpose is "(1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire
'23
and oral communications may be authorized.
Under Title III vigorous judicial supervision of the entire
surveillance process is required. 24 First, under section 2518 a
written application must be submitted to a judge containing a
"full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant," including:
(i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being,
or is about to be committed,
(ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the
facilities from which or the place where the communication is
to be intercepted,
(iii) a particular description of the type of communications
sought to be intercepted,
the of(iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing
2
fense whose communications are to be intercepted. 5
21. Id. at 1302-03.
22. Id. The Eighth Circuit emphasized that it was "concerned only
with the basic thrust of the Act's wiretap provisions". Id. at 1302.
Specifically, Cox did not involve evidence of a crime other than that
for which the wiretap order was procured, nor an emergency wiretap
consummated prior to judicial authorization. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2517(5),
2518(7). Serious questions have been raised concerning the constitutionality of these provisions of the Act. See Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Leave of the Magistrate: The Case In Opposition, 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 169 (1969); Note, Eavesdropping Provisions of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968: How Do They Stand In Light
of Recent Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 VALPARAISO U.L. Rsv. 89, 94, 100
(1968). But see United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971)
(upholding constitutionality of section 2517(5) ). However, a discussion
of these provisions is beyond the scope of the Cox opinion and this
Comment.
23. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. COns
CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 2112, 2153 (1968).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970).
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It should be noted that while section 2518 requires only a description of the type of conversation sought, Berger speaks in
terms of describing the particular conversations sought. 20 However, the statutory interpretation of the Berger requirement appears reasonable. As noted in United States v. Skarloff, "
[it is sufficient for the order to show a finding of probable
cause that conversations will be overheard implicating the suspect in ... criminal conduct, without describing the specific
content of the anticipated conversations. It would be virtually
impossible for the applicant ... to predict ... the exact language.... To impose such an absolute requirement ...
would render Title III totally ineffective.
Section 2518(3) further requires that before any authorization of interception is issued, the court must find the allegations
of the application supported by probable cause, including findings that:
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular
offense... ;
(b) there is probable cause for the belief that particular communications concerning
that offense will be obtained through
28
such interception.
In addition, the application must contain a showing of exigent
circumstances to overcome the lack of notice to the persons
whose communications are to be intercepted..2 9 Exigent circumstances have generally been considered established if there is a
showing that "normal investigative procedures have been tried
and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed
if tried or to be too dangerous ....
,30
Even if the court determines the application sufficient and
authorizes surveillance, the surveillance may not extend "for
any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of
the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days." 31
Moreover, the court may still retain control of subsequent events
though the application is approved. Section 2518 (6) allows the
authorizing court to require progress reports at intervals it
deems appropriate. Upon conclusion of the interception, the
court receives the results of the surveillance, which can be sealed
at the court's discretion, 32 and determines on whom an inven26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

388 U.S. at 59.
323 F. Supp. 296, 307 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (c) (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970). See United States v. Leta, 332 F.

Supp. 1357, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1971).

32. 18U.S.C. § 2518(8) (a) (1970).
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tory shall be served and under what conditions."3 Therefore,
judicial supervision of the electronic surveillance process is present from the outset of the search until its conclusion.
Even with these numerous procedural safeguards, some commentators have adopted the view that electronic surveillance is
inherently unconstitutional, and thus still argue that Title III
is unconstitutional. 34 However, this argument has seemingly
been rejected by the Supreme Court in the Osborn, Berger and
Katz opinions, all of which imply that electronic eavesdropping,
and therefore an electronic eavesdropping authorization statute,
can be constitutional. Assuming this to be the case, the Eighth
Circuit correctly concluded in Cox that Title III is constitutional, for if any statute meets the requirement imposed on
electronic surveillance by the recent Supreme Court cases, Title
III certainly does.

Immigration Law: Immigrant Convicted of Statutory

Rape Subject to Deportation for Commission of Crime
Involving Moral Turpitude
Petitioner Marciano, a citizen of Morocco and Israel, had entered the United States on an immigration visa. Within a year
after entry, he was arrested and charged with the crime of statutory rape,' to which he pleaded guilty. On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, his conviction was affirmed.2 Subsequently he was granted an evidentiary hearing on a petition for
postconviction relief, and the court made certain findings of fact
concerning the circumstances of the crime and conclusions of
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (d), (10) (a) (1970).
34. See Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 169 (1969).
1. MINN. STAT. § 609.295(4) (1971) reads in pertinent part:
Whoever has sexual intercourse with a female child under the
age of 18 years and not his spouse may be sentenced as follows:
(4)

If the child is 16 years of age, but under the age of 18

years and the offender is 21 years of age or older, by imprisonment for not more than three years.
Criminal intent is specifically excluded as an element of the offense
under MiNN. STAT. § 609.02(9) (6) (1971), which provides:
Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the
age of a minor even though age is a material element in the
crime in question.
2. State v. Marciano, 283 Minn. 200, 167 N.W.2d 41 (1969).
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law pertaining to the guilty plea. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) then initiated proceedings to deport
Marciano because of his conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude. 3 The Special Inquiry Officer determined that petitioner was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and
should be deported, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Reviewing the order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (a), the
Eighth Circuit, over a vigorous dissent, affirmed, holding that
statutory rape was a crime involving moral turpitude. 4 Marciano v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 450 F.2d 1022
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972).1
The first use of the concept of "moral turpitude" in the
United States immigration laws came in 1891, although barriers
against the entry of persons convicted of crime were introduced
in 1875.6 The Immigration Act of 1917 introduced the use of
deportation for criminal activities in the United States, and the
1952 revision retained and strengthened the procedures.7
Currently 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (4) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Any alien in the United States... shall, upon the order of
the Attorney General, be deported who(4) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry and either sentenced
to confinement or confined therefor in a prison or corrective
institution, for a year or more, or who at any time after
entry is convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude,
not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of
whether the convictions were in a single trial ....
Thus, an alien is subject to deportation if he commits a crime

involving moral turpitude within five years after entry or if he

commits two such crimes at any time after entry.8 The policy
behind the statute is obvious. Congress clearly wanted to pre3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (4) (1970). The text of the provisions is
contained in the text following note 7 infra.
4. Petitioner had also contended that the phrase "crime involving
moral turpitude" was unconstitutionally vague under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. The court held that it was foreclosed
from consideration of that issue under Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S.
223 (1951).
5. Noted in 4 ST. MARY's L.J. 126 (1972).
6. 1 C. GoRDoN & H. ROSENFEL, IMMIGRATioN LAW AND PROCEDupx § 4.12a (1966 rev.). See also S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.,
43-66 (1950); H. RFE. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 11-16 (1952).
7. 1 C. GORDON &H. RosENxrw, supra note 6, § 4.12a.
8. However, certain factors, such as pardon and judicial recommendation, render the deportation provisions inapplicable. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b)

(1970).

note 6, § 4.15.

See generally 1 C. GORDON & H. RosENFELD,

supra
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vent "undesirables" from entering the country and to rid the
country of those aliens who evidence their "undesirability" after
entryf
A critical analysis of the concept of "moral turpitude" as
applied in deportation cases requires a discussion of the interplay
of both definitional and procedural aspects of the term. As
pointed out in the major treatise in the area, "[a] ttempts to arrive at a workable definition of moral turpitude never have
yielded entire satisfaction."' 0 Legislative history of the term is
at best murky." Of the judicially enunciated definitions, perhaps the most commonly cited is that which refers to a deed of
moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and man. 1 2 The viability
of such a definition must be questioned, however, when it appears that theft of a dozen golf balls has fallen within the orbit
of crimes involving moral turpitude. 3 Recourse to the dictionaries, "the last resort of the baffled judge,""' provides little additional elucidation.',
A search of the cases for guiding principles which might emerge as common denominators leads, unfortunately, to the conclusion that the "chief impression from
the cases is the caprice of the judgments."' 0 Additionally, examination of judicial treatment of various "classes" of crimes
7
provides little guidance.'
9. See generally S. REP. No. 1137, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 21-23 (1952);

H. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-16 (1952).
10. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 6, § 4.13a at 4-99.
11. See the discussion of Justice Jackson, dissenting in Jordan v.

De George, 341 U.S. 223, 233-36 (1951).

See also S. REP. No. 1515, 81st

Cong., 2d Sess., 350-54 (1950).
12. Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 1931),

citing In re Henry, 15 Idaho 755, 758, 99 P. 1054, 1055 (1909).

13. Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954), rev'd per curiam
on other grounds sub nom., Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955).

ion).

14.

Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951)

(dissenting opin-

15. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1686-87 (4th ed. 1968).
16. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 239 (1951) (dissenting opinion). In a footnote, Justice Jackson compared three pairs of cases illustrating the capriciousness of the outcomes. Id. at 239-40 n.13.
17. A good overview of some specific applications of the moral
turpitude standard to specific crimes can be found in C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, supra note 6, § 4.14. Of crimes against the person, murder,
voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, and various types of aggravated
assault have been held to be crimes involving moral turpitude, while
involuntary manslaughter, various types of simple assault, attempted

suicide, riot, and carrying concealed weapons have been held not to
involve moral turpitude. Id. § 4.14b and cases cited therein. With re-
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Procedural aspects also play an important part in understanding the use of the concept of moral turpitude. Of vital importance is the rule enunciated in United States ex rel. Mylius
v. Uhl' s to the effect that the determination of the existence of
moral turpitude must be based solely on the judgment of conviction rather than on testimony adduced at the trial,1 9 and, inferentially, not on any independent findings of fact. . 0

Hence,

the state statute and conviction record control, despite the
fact that the appraisal of turpitude is always a federal question.21

The interplay of the definitional and procedural aspects of
the moral turpitude concept has led to two basic judicial approaches, and a suggestion for a third, which has yet to carry
the majority of any court. The Mylius case enunciated what is
now the majority rule:
[T]he law must be administered upon broad, general lines and
if a crime does not in its essence involve moral turpitude, a person found guilty of such a crime cannot be excluded 2because
he
2
is shown, aliunde the record, to be a depraved person.
sp'ect to sexual crimes and crimes involving family relationship, common law and statutory rape, adultery, abortion, bigamy, prostitution
and lewdness have been held to involve moral turpitude, while bastardy, vagrancy, maintaining a nuisance, fornication, and mailing an
obscene letter have been held not to involve moral turpitude. Id. §
4.14c and cases cited therein. However, certain crimes, such as gross
indecency, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, abandonment of a minor child, and incest have required investigation into the record of the conviction or the nature of the statute.
Id. Of crimes against property, those involving fraud, and major
crimes such as arson, blackmail, robbery, and other forms of theft have
been held to involve moral turpitude, while similar crimes of a lesser
degree have been held not to involve moral turpitude. Id. § 4.14d and
cases cited therein.
18. 210 F. 860 (2d Cir. 1914).
19. Id. at 863; accord People v. Olah, 300 N.Y. 96, 89 N.E.2d 329,
19 A.L.R.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1949); State v. Briton, 256 Minr. 326, 121 N.W.
2d 577 (1963).
20. United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.
1939); Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929).
21. Wyngaard v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 527, 528 (D.D.C. 1960), aff'd
per curiam sub nom., Wyngaard v. Kennedy, 295 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961).

See also 1 C. GoRmoN & H.

RosENnmED,

supra note 6, § 4.13b. It is interesting to note, however, that the question of what is a "crime" also appears to be treated as a federal question. See United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956),
where the court held that violation of a statute which has authoritatively been interpreted by state courts to constitute an "offense" rather
than a "crime" was nevertheless a "crime" for the purposes of deportation.
22. United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir.
1914) (emphasis added).
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Thus, the INS and the reviewing courts must determine whether
all criminal conduct under a particular statute must necessarily
involve moral turpitude. Although it has been suggested that
this view evolved at a time when the prevailing concept of the
permissible fact-finding discretion of administrative agencies
was quite restrictive, 23 this rule is currently followed in the
Courts of the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and District of Co24
lumbia Circuits.
The minority view was first enunciated in the decision of
25
the First Circuit in Pino v. Nicolls:
If the crime in its general nature is one which in common usage
would be classified as a crime involving moral turpitude, neither the administrative officials in a deportation proceeding nor
the courts on review of administrative action are under the oppressive burden of taking and considering evidence of the circumstances of a particular offense so as to determine whether
there were extenuating factors which might relieve the offender
of the stigma of moral obliquity.
In requiring examination of only the general nature of the crime
and its classification in common usage, the First Circuit departed from the approach taken by the majority of courts. It
did, however, adhere to the procedural rule of avoiding the "oppressive burden" of independent fact finding.
The third approach which has been suggested would involve
a "three-classification" rule. This view was enunciated by Judge
Anderson, dissenting in Tillinghast v. Edmead,2 quoting from
the trial court's opinion:
Whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude under this test may be a question of fact. Some crimes are of
such character as necessarily to involve this element; others...
do not; and still others might involve it or might not. As to
this last class the circumstances must be regarded to determine
whether moral turpitude was shown.
This standard departs from both of the previously examined
rules in that it recognizes a third category: one encompassing
crimes which might or might not involve moral turpitude. Fur23.

Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1027 n.3

(8th Cir. 1971)

(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972).

24. Rassano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 377 F.2d 971 (7th Cir.
1966); Wadman v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.
1964); Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States
ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952); United
States ex tel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1939).
25. 215 F.2d 237, 245 (1st Cir. 1954), rev'd per curiam on other
grounds sub nom., Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955) (emphasis
added).
26. 31 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1929) (dissenting opinion), citing Ex
parte Edmead, 27 F.2d 438, 439 (D. Mass. 1928).

19731

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

1173

ther, it departs from the procedural approaches of prior cases
by allowing independent determinations of fact in those cases
where moral turpitude might or might not be involved. This
third approach is the one advocated by the dissenting judge in
Marciano.
After a rather extensive examination of the statute in question,27 the Minnesota Supreme Court opinion in the criminal
case, 28 and the findings of the trial court at the postconviction
evidentiary hearing,29 the majority in Marciano concluded that
Marciano's guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently made,
that he was represented by competent counsel, that he had been
the "aggressor" and had knowledge of the age of the victim.30
The opinion went on to note that federal courts had consistently
held statutory rape to be a crime involving moral turpitude."
The court accordingly held that Marciano was properly ordered
deported.
Judge Eisele, dissenting, engaged in a lengthy examination
of the majority and minority rules and their underlying policies. 32 Rejecting both of the established rules, he argued vigorously for the adoption of the "three-classification" rule.3 3 Turning to the facts of the case, Judge Eisele found that statutory
rape did not fit either of the "black and white" categories of the
three-classification rule, and concluded that the record was insufficient to determine, as a matter of federal law, whether
Marciano's conduct involved moral turpitude, and that the case
34
should be remanded for such a factual determination.
In light of existing precedent, it is difficult to fault the decision of the majority, since statutory rape has, apparently without exception, been held to be a crime involving moral turpitude. Furthermore, there was a fact determination indicating
27.

MmN.

STAT.

§ 609.295(4)

(1971).

See note 1 supra for text of

statute.
28. State v. Marciano, 283 Minn. 200, 167 N.W.2d 41 (1969).

29. Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1024-25
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972).
30.

Id.

31.

Id. at 1025.

See Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954),

rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom., Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S.
901 (1955); Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1931);
Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1927); United States ex rel. Marks
v. Esperdy, 203 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 315
F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd by an equally divided court, 377 U.S. 214
(1964).

32.
33.
34.

450 F.2d at 1026-28. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
Id. at 1028-29. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
Id. at 1029-31.
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that Marciano was the aggressor. The majority opinion is, however, subject to criticism for its failure to state which standard
was employed in reaching the decision.3 5 Also, by merely citing the statutory rape cases 36 the court missed an opportunity to
examine rationales behind the standards. If it is true, for example, that Congress intended moral turpitude to be a flexible
concept, subject to the shifting societal mores, 3 7 a 1969 conviction for statutory rape might well be held subject to a different
standard from that applied to convictions in 1927 and 1931.88
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that some of the cases holding
statutory rape to be a crime involving moral turpitude came out
of circuits subscribing to the majority view that a crime must
"of necessity" involve moral turpitude. 9 Considering the technical nature of the crime of statutory rape,'" courts should be
hesitant to conclude that such a crime would "of necessity" involve moral turpitude. Hence, the authority of the cited cases
might be questioned.
It is from the dissent, however, that the Marciano decision
derives its importance. Aside from any other factor, the dissent
is important for its perceptive analysis, classification, and conceptualization. All too frequently in the past courts have dealt
with the moral turpitude concept without stating their standards of decision or recognizing the different approaches. The
Marciano dissent is a valuable contribution for that reason alone.
Beyond its level of conceptualization, however, the Marciano
dissent is valuable for its examination of the policies behind the
various rules. Furthermore, evaluation of the various policies
involved makes the dissent's conclusions regarding the relative
desirability of the various rules compelling. For example, a
recurring justification for the procedural rule which forbids independent fact determination is that such a task would be an
"oppressive burden. '41 The dissent would suggest that the magnitude of the burden be evaluated with such threshold questions
35. The dissent asserted that the majority opinion implicitly rejected the traditional majority view, since statutory rape does not "of
necessity" involve moral turpitude. Id. at 1027 & n.4.
36. See cases cited in note 31 supra.
37. 1 C. GoRDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 6, § 4.13a; cf. United
States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920, 921 (2d Cir. 1929).
38. See cases cited in note 31 supra.
39. Compare the cases cited in notes 24 &31 supra.
40. See Marciano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 450 F.2d 1022,
1029 n.6 (8th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997
(1972).
41.

Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237, 245 (1st Cir. 1954), rev'd per
curiam on other grounds sub nom., Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955).
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as how many deportation proceedings for crimes involving moral
turpitude take place annually. But beyond that point, under the
scheme proposed in the dissent in which such fact determinations would be made only where moral turpitude might or might
not be involved, it would appear clear that there would be no
potential for the dreaded "oppressive burden" of fact finding.
Such fact determinations would be restricted to a very few
cases.
The dissent further noted major deficiencies with each of
the existing rules. The restrictive test of the traditional rule
which limits analysis to the abstract "essence" of the crime is
subject to criticism since it undoubtedly permits significant
numbers of aliens guilty of crimes involving moral turpitude to
remain in the United States. 42 Likewise the "general nature"
test of Pino v. Nicolls could easily err in the opposite direction. 4 3 Unquestionably, one of the strongest arguments in favor
of the "three-classification" rule is that it could go far toward
eliminating the inequities inherent in the other rules, since it
would permit the INS and reviewing courts to examine the particular facts of an individual case in light of the purpose of the
deportation statute.
Another argument in favor of adopting the rule advocated
by the dissent in Marciano relates to a recognition of the inconsistency and capriciousness inherent in the application of the
other rules: "How many aliens have been deported who would
not have been had some other judge heard their cases, and vice
versa, we may only guess.1 44 The inconsistency of the laws
from state to state is also a factor. The dissent pointed out that
the conduct punished as statutory rape in Minnesota would not
be subject to prosecution for statutory rape in any one of 27
other states. 45 The "three-classification" rule would alleviate
at least some of the inequity which inheres in the present application of the law since it permits both the INS and reviewing
courts somewhat greater latitude in analyzing the conduct of a
particular alien whose deportation is in question, rather than
42. 450 F.2d at 1027. See, e.g., United States ex reL. Guarino v.
Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1939) (possession of jimmy not "necessarily"
or "inherently" immoral).
43. 450 F.2d at 1028. See, e.g., the hypotheticals cited in dissent
in Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1929) (dissenting opinion).

44. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 239-40 (1951)
opinion).
45. 450 F.2d at 1026 n.1 (dissenting opinion).

(dissenting
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restricting such authorities to an examination of convictions under differing state criminal codes.
In sum, the Marciano court cannot be faulted for the outcome
alone. It did, however, pass up an opportunity to engage in creative application of the law. The argument presented in the
Marciano dissent calling for a different application of the moral
turpitude standard is compelling, and it contains a sound proposal for the future direction of the development of the law in
this area.

Patents: Obviousness to be Deiermined as a
Maier of Law, Subject to Factual Inquiry
Plaintiff Alpana, holder of a patent relating to a thermally
insulated frame designed for use in metal windows or doors,
sued defendant Flour City for patent infringement. In consolidated suits between Alpana and Flour City, the district court in
an unreported opinion held the patent invalid on the ground of
obviousness of the subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 103' and
therefore determined that there had been no infringement.On appeal, Alpana contended that the trial court's finding of obviousness was clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 3 Flour City argued that the finding was not clearly erroneous. Thus, both parties on appeal
treated the issue of obviousness as a question of fact. In affirming the district court's decision, the Eighth Circuit held that
the ultimate determination of obviousness of the subject matter
of a patent was to be made as a matter of law, based upon several factual inquiries. Flour City Architectural Metals v. Alpana Aluminum Products, Inc., 454 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1972).
1. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970) provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this

title if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a

whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.

2. The district court also held the patent invalid for reasons of
specificity, but the court of appeals did not reach that issue.
3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) reads in pertinent part:
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial

court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

...
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The legal concept of "obviousness" originated as a judicially
created requirement for patentability called "invention" which
was developed as a gloss on the existing statutory requirements
of utility4 and novelty.5 Most authorities 6 credit Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood with the first statement of this concept.7 Although
Hotchkiss developed the concept of obviousness, it gave no indication of the standard to be employed in reviewing determinations applying the concept.8
The early Supreme Court cases disagreed as to whether the
standard for invention was a question of fact or a question of
law, a conflict that still divides courts. The controversy was
framed in Mahn v. Harwood, ° where the Court in dictum stated
that "whether the thing patented amounts to a patentable invention" is a question of law,1 ' and in Keyes v. Grant,'2 which
held that the standard of invention was a question of fact. Subsequently in Graver Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Co.,' 3 a case
particularly conducive to treatment of the obviousness question
as one of fact,' 4 the Supreme Court made repeated reference to
the advantages possessed by the trial court in fact finding. It
held that regardless of whether the trial court upheld or invalidated the patent before it, review by the appellate court was
limited by the "clearly erroneous" standard. Although the opin4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
6. Harris, Section 103 Revisited, 9 IDEA 617, 618 (1965-66).
7. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850). In invalidating a patent relating
to ceramic doorknobs, the court articulated the following standard:
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method

of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the appli-

cation of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed
by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there
was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words.
the improvement is the work of a skillful mechanic, not that of
the inventor.
Id. at 267.
8. The Hotchkiss Court apparently did not reach the scope of
appellate review issue since it would have resolved the obviousness
question as had the trier of fact below.

9. Sherman, Obviousness: A Question of Law or of Fact?, 51 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 547 (1969).
10. 112 U.S. 354 (1884).
11. Id. at 358.
12. 118 U.S. 25 (1886).
13. 336 U.S. 271 (1948), aff'd on rehearing, 339 U.S. 605 (1949).
14. The Court concluded that "to no type of case is this last clause
[of Rule 52(a)] more appropriately applicable than to the one before
us. ..

."

336 U.S. at 274.

The patent itself was complex, and the trial

lasted for three weeks, involving a number of expert witnesses, movies
and demonstrations.
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ion rested heavily on the complexity of the facts involved, this
case has been accepted as unequivocal authority that invention
and validity are questions of fact. 15
Considerable doubts were cast upon this entire line of precedent two years after Graver by the Great A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Co.1 decision. In the A & P case the Supreme Court, although stating that it was setting aside "no finding of fact as to
invention," made an independent review of the trial court record, thereby undercutting the question of fact rule. 17 The concurring opinion of Justice Douglas stated explicitly what the majority opinion left to inference. In essence, Justice Douglas maintained that the standard of invention "goes back to a Constitutional standard," and controls when patent validity is at issue,
and that the validity of a patent is, therefore, a question of law. 8
The A & P case and a per curiam decision 9 the following
year would appear to indicate that the question of invention is a
freely reviewable question of law.2 0 On closer analysis, however, the decision, while not explicitly holding that invention is
a question of law, leaves the status of the question of fact rule
seriously in doubt.
The passage of the Patent Act of 1952,21 which includes an
obviousness standard codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103, accompanied
by a committee report emphasizing the need for uniformity, 22 did
little to alleviate the uncertainty surrounding the question of
fact standard. The first Supreme Court decision interpreting
§ 103 was Graham V. John Deere Co. 23 in which the Court stated:
The emphasis on nonobviousness ... comports with the
constitutional strictures.
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law,
the § 103 condition . . . lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are
15.

See, e.g., Comment, 29 U. CHi. L. REv. 185 (1961).

16. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
17. A comparison of the standard used by the trial court with a
so called "required" standard and a review of the record independent
of any clearly erroneous findings by the trial court allow an inference
that there is a correct statutorily-based method to decide a case and
that the question is therefore one of law.
18.

(1950).

19.
20.

Great A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155-56
Crest Specialty v. Trager, 341 U.S. 912 (1951).
Note, Appellate Review of Finding of Invention, 20 GEo. WASH.

L. REv. 605 (1952).
21.

Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 798.

22. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952); H.R. REP. No.
1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952).
23. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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to be determined; differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background,
the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.
This is not to say, however, that there will not be difficulties in applying the nonobviousness test. What is obvious
is not a question upon which there is likely to be uniformity of
thought in every given factual context. The difficulties, however, are comparable to those encountered daily by the courts in
such frames of reference as negligence and scienter, and should
be amenable to a case-by-case development. We believe that
strict observance of the requirements laid down here will result
in that uniformity
and definiteness which Congress called for
24
in the 1952 Act.
In thus specifying the factual inquiries to be made, the Court
was presumably motivated by a desire for uniformity. Nevertheless, the decision has been cited to support both the propo-

sition that obviousness is a question of fact2

and the proposi-

tion that it is a question of law.26 Some courts, disregarding the
obviousness language, cite Graham only for the three factual inquiries. 27 Since there has been no Supreme Court development
of the issue since Graham,2 8 the Court has left the fact-law controversy apparently at a point at which patent validity is a question of law, while obviousness involves several factual questions. Although it can be inferred that the determination of
obviousness is a question of law, the issue is not yet settled.
In the period between A & P and Graham, the Eighth Circuit's rule was a comfortable synthesis of Graver and A & P. The
court held simply that the question of obviousness was a question of fact, but where an improper standard had been applied
to the facts in making the obviousness decision, the matter became a question of law29 or was reversible as clearly erroneous. 30 Substantively, either alternative permits the same scope
of review.
24. Id. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
25. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Sylvania Elec. Prod. Inc.,
415 F.2d 719 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970); Eimco
Corp. v. Peterson Filters & Eng'r Co., 406 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969).
26. See Lemelson v. Topper Corp., 450 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 375 F.2d
432 (9th Cir. 1967).
27. See, e.g., Eisele v. St. Amour, 423 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1970).
28. See Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57
(1969), where the Court merely emphasized strict observance of the
three Grahamfactual inquiries.
29. Steffan v. Weber Heating & Sheet Metal Co., 237 F.2d 601
(8th Cir. 1956).
30. Caldwell v. Kirk Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 915 (1959).
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The first cases decided after Graham in 1966 continued to
rely on the lower court's application of an improper standard
to gain review but increased the allowable breadth of that review. 31 They also began to hedge on the fact-law quality of obviousness. 3 2 In that same year the court first stated that obviousness was a question of law. 33 From that point until the
1971 Flour City decision, the majority of cases at least implied
that obviousness was a question of law, while two cases held
34
that it was a question of fact.
Even within the cases considering obviousness a question of
law, there was a good deal of variation in opinion as to the scope
of appellate review. A number of decisions made an independent review of nearly all the facts in a case, ignoring any of the
trial court findings which Graham denominated to be factual inquiries. 35 Another large group of cases relied substantially upon
the factual determinations made by the trial courts and then inquired as to the application of a proper standard by the lower
court. 36 Thus, although there was a trend in the Eighth Circuit
toward looking at obviousness as a question of law while giving
intermediate findings of the trial court fact treatment, this trend
was not unanimous, and there was substantial disagreement as to
how much respect intermediate findings were to be given.
After reviewing the conflicting post-Graham Eighth Circuit
decisions, the Flour City court analyzed Graham and noted its
shortcomings in failing to "articulate with particularity" a
31.

See Skee-Trainer, Inc. v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 361 F.2d 895 (8th

Cir. 1966); Kell-Dot Indus., Inc. v. Graves, 361 F.2d 25 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 385 U.S. 842 (1966); American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v.
Lambert Indus., Inc., 360 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920
(1966).
32. See, e.g., American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus.,
Inc., 360 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920 (1966).

33.
1966).
34.

Piel Mfg. Co. v. George A. Rolfes Co., 363 F.2d 57 (8th Cir.
Gallo v. Norris Dispensers, Inc., 445 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1971)

(per curiam); Automated Bldg. Components v. Hydro-Air Eng'r, 362

F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1966).

35. See Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prod. Co., 513 F.2d 89 (8th
Cir. 1969); General Mills Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 378 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.
1967); L & A Prod. Inc. v. Britt Tech. Corp., 365 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1960).

36.

See Ralston Purina Co. v. General Goods Corp., 442 F.2d 389

(8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); University of Ill. Foundation v. Winegard

Co., 402 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 917 (1969); Gerner
v. Moog Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1967); Greening Nursery
Co. v. J & R Tool and Mfg. Co., 376 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1967). In these
cases the appellate court seemed to limit its review more when it respected the district judge's opinion and when affirming the district
court's opinion.
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standard of review and to expressly overrule prior conflicting
authority, most notably Graver. The court then attempted to
eliminate both of these shortcomings. It declared that "the ultimate question of obviousness vel non!' is "a matter of law, not
fact."37 The court based this rule on the concurring opinion of
Justices Douglas and Black in A & P, which construed the majority opinion therein as a rejection of the rule in Graver. Further
support for this holding was found in the "independent review of
the record" made in Graham. Flour City thus eliminates any
doubt about the nature of the obviousness question in the Eighth
Circuit.
The only remaining uncertainty in the Eighth Circuit was
the breadth of available review. In this regard, the court stated
that the factual inquiries underlying the obviousness determination were subject to the constraints of Rule 52(a). As enumerated by the Eighth Circuit, these inquiries include determination of the scope and content of the prior art, ascertainment
of the differences between the prior art and the patent claims
at issue and resolution of the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.33 As a result, the Eighth Circuit will no longer reverse the fact findings of a trial court unless they are clearly
erroneous.3 9
Flour City has placed the Eighth Circuit among those jurisdictions employing a mixed fact and law rule. Under this rule:
[t]he issue of obviousness is a hybrid question involving both
fact and law. The clearest explanation of the question might
be to consider it one of law which turns upon the facts....
Obviousness40 is based upon the facts, but ultimately is a question of law.
By accepting the mixed fact-law rule, the Eighth Circuit has
joined the plurality circuit opinion and made it the majority
41
opinion. At present, six circuits follow a mixed fact-law rule,

37. 454 F.2d at 106.
38. Id.

39. The court seemed to depart from its own rule by making inde-

pendent findings as to ordinary skill. Although it did make its
own findings, it probably was not rejecting the findings of the district court. See also Hadfield v. Ryan Equipt. Co., 456 F.2d 1218 (8th
Cir. 1972).
40. Sherman, supra note 9, at 557.
41. In addition to the Eighth Circuit, the following circuits have
adopted the mixed fact-law rule: the Fifth Circuit [See Swofford v.
B & W, Inc., 395 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968),
the Flour City of the Fifth Circuit. It based its rule on the Seventh
Circuit rule. The case of Waldon, Inc. v. Alexander Mfg. Co., 423 F.2d
91 (5th Cir. 1970), explicitly used the Graham inquiries rather than
those in Swofford]; the Sixth Circuit [See Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v.
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two circuits are clear question of law jurisdictions,"2 and two
circuits are uncertain in their rule but appear to be leaning toward the mixed rule.

43

A mixed fact-law rule is preferable in the sense that it combines the best of each of the other rules, even though its application in a particular case may not always be exceedingly clear.
By making the final application of the standard a question of
law, the rule allows the appellate court a scope of review broad
enough to ensure uniformity of results. Since the final decision
Heckethorn Mfg. & Sup. Co., 332 F.2d 406 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 888 (1964). This circuit's most recent expression of the rule has
been Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971)]; the Seventh Circuit, [See Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1960) (en banc)]; the
Ninth Circuit [See Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 375 F.2d 432 (9th
Cir. 1967)]; the D.C. Circuit [See International Salt Co. v. Commissioner of Patents, 436 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Higley v. Brenner,
387 F.2d 855 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But see Commissioner of Patents v.
Deutsche Gold-Und-Silber-Scheideanstalt Vormals Roessler, 397 F.2d
656 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where Burger, J. cites early D.C. cases and miscites
Higley to conclude that obviousness is a question of fact]. The Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals has also adopted the rule. See In re
Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011
(C.C.P.A. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1057 (1968).

42. These are: The Second Circuit [See Shaw v. E.B. & A.C.

Whiting Co., 417 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1076

(1970); Gross v. J.F.D. Mfg. Co., 314 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1963). These cases
state a rule of mixed review but actually their review is very broad.

In Lemelson v. Topper Corp., 450 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,

405 U.S. 989 (1972), this circuit may be approaching the mixed rule];

and the Third Circuit [See Packwood v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 195
F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 844 (1952). This is the

only case in this circuit and it was decided before § 103 was enacted.
It held that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was proper,

thus indicating a strong question of law orientation very early.
43. These are: the First Circuit [See Contour Saws, Inc. v. L.S.
Starre H. Co., 444 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1971); Nashua Corp. v. RCA Corp.,
431 F.2d 220 (1st Cir. 1970); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Sylvania
Elec. Prod., Inc., 415 F.2d 719 (1st Cir., 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061
(1970); Koppers Co. v. Foster Grant Co., 396 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1968).
If read in consecutive order, this series of decisions indicates a trend
toward a mixed fact-law rule. It is possible, however, to interpret the
cases as indicating a fact-rule. Since all four decisions are affirmances
of trial court decisions, it could be that this circuit will use any appropriate theory to support an affirmance, thus giving the trial court
decision ultimate weight. This review is even more strict than that required by FED. R. Cirv. P. 52 (a).]; and the Tenth Circuit [See Continental
Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 415 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914 (1970); Eimco Corp. v. Peterson Filters & Engr. Co.,
406 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969); Griswold
v. Oil Capital Value Co., 375 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1966). These decisions
are spotty but Continental Can did review the record when an erroneous standard was used by the district court.]
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of obviousness necessitates a consideration of the policies underlying the statute, uniformity of decisional standards is desirable. 44 The courts of appeal can provide
such uniformity more
4
readily than can the district courts.

5

An additional desirable result of the standard enunciated in
Flour City is greater predictability of results. Such predictability may be particularly encouraging to small inventors since
they can least afford the expense of protracted and unpredictable litigation.
The restrictions imposed upon intermediate findings by the
question of fact test also benefit the patent system. The rule
takes into consideration the fact that the trier's determination
rests upon the ability to see the witnesses, both expert and nonexpert, and to hear their testimony. 4" Judicial resources are
conserved, and possibly a more just decision is ensured, if the
findings of fact are conclusive at the trial court level. In addition, the relegation of a portion of the final decision to the trial
court permits avoidance of certain detrimental aspects of appellate review. Since a major portion of a decision is resolved at
the trial level, there will be fewer specious appeals in which a
party nevertheless attempts to secure broad review. As a result, the lag between invention and patent is decreased. This
decrease is particularly valuable to the small patent holder who
can afford neither the costs of appeals nor the unavailability
of
47
his assets during the time spent in the appeal process.
Thus the mixed fact-law rule provides a preferable standard for appellate review of questions of patentability. It offers
most of the benefits of both approaches while minimizing their
detriments. In expressly adopting the mixed rule, the Eighth
Circuit has not only clarified the rule in the circuit but also
selected the optimal rule.

44. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at 625; Comment, supra note
15, at 197.
45. It has been said to be an "inescapable solipsism that subjects
patent applications to the test of as many different standards of patentability as there are district judges." Gross v. JFD Mfg. Co., 207 F.
Supp. 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd, 314 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 832 (1963).
46. Comment, supra note 15, at 195.
47. Note, supranote 20, at 606.
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Sales: Estoppel Defense Available in Suit by Carrier
Against Consignee for Freight Charges Notwithstanding
Section 6 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act
Plaintiff Southern Pacific Transport Company, the carrier,
delivered to defendant Campbell Soup Company, the consignee,
four separate shipments under uniform straight bills of lading.,
Each bill noted that the freight charges were to be prepaid.
Upon receipt of each shipment, Campbell paid the consignor the
cost of the merchandise plus freight charges. After unsuccessfully attempting to collect the freight charges from the consignor, Southern Pacific sued Campbell for the unpaid freight
bills. Campbell pleaded the defense of estoppel and, after the
district court entered summary judgment for Southern Pacific,
Campbell appealed. The Eighth Circuit held that where a carrier delivers shipments to a consignee under prepaid bills of
lading and the consignee in reliance on such notation reimburses
the consignor, the consignee is entitled to raise the defense of
estoppel since under the circumstances the defense is not violative of the anti-discrimination section of the Interstate Commerce Act.2 Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Campbell
Soup Co., 455 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1972).
The Interstate Commerce Act provides that railroads are
required to collect the full charges set out in the various tariffs
established by the Interstate Commerce Commission and that
failure to collect is discriminatory. 3 In order to assure that this
anti-discrimination provision not be violated, the Supreme Court
in Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v.
Fink4 held that a consignee is relieved from liability only when
1. See In re Bills of Lading, 52 I.C.C. 671, 740 (1919), for the law
pertinent to a Uniform Bill of Lading.

2. 49 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1970).
3. 49 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
No carrier ... shall ... charge or demand or collect or receive
a greater or less or different compensation for such transportation of passengers or property, or for any service in connection therewith, between the points named in such tariffs than
the rates, fares, and charges which are specified in the tariff
filed and in effect at the time; nor shall any carrier refund or
remit in any manner or by any device any portion of the
rates, fares, and charges so specified, nor extend to any shipper
or person any privileges or facilities in the transportation of
passengers or property, except such as are specified in such
tariffs.
By this wording, unintentional as well as intentional rebates fall within
the statutory prohibition.
4.

250 U.S. 577 (1919).
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he has paid the legally required rate to the carrier. In Fink the
carrier had mistakenly misrepresented the shipping charges, undercharging the consignee. Although the consignee relied upon
the lower cost in fixing the sales price of his goods, the court held
he could not set up the defense of estoppel against a claim for
the amount by which he was mistakenly undercharged. 5 The
Eighth Circuit applied the Fink holding in Central Warehouse
Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co.,0 a case in which the carrier mistakenly marked the bill of lading prepaid although the term of
shipment was collect on delivery. Thus the consignee had not
paid for the freight. The court held that an estoppel defense by
the consignee 7 would not lie in the carrier's suit for freight
charges because it would violate the anti-discrimination clause of
the Interstate Commerce Act.8
Since the Central Warehouse case, the Eighth Circuit has
not considered the availability to a consignee of the defense of
estoppel in a suit by a carrier to collect freight charges. The issue in Southern Pacific, therefore, was whether the anti-discrimination clause required that a consignee be absolutely liable
to the carrier for freight charges upon acceptance of the goods.
Most of the court's opinion was devoted to a discussion of
the Fink9 and Central Warehouse'0 cases. The court first detailed the facts of Central Warehouse, noting that it presented
a "slightly different factual question' 11 from the Fink decision,
while acknowledging that the Central Warehouse court fully
5. Id.
6. 20 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1927), af-fg 14 F.2d 123 (D. Minn. 1926).
7. More precisely, the consignee's defense was that he had relied upon the representations of prepayment by the carrier in remitting
the proceeds of the sale, less his commission, to the consignor. 20 F.2d
at 828.
8. The following language explains the court's view of how the
estoppel defense contravenes the anti-discrimination provision of 49
U.S.C. § 6(7) (1970):
The duty imposed upon the carrier by the act applicable to
interstate shipments was to collect the lawful rate. This obligation was not only in its own interest, but in the interest of
the public. It is not permitted to escape its duty by an oversight and thereby effect a discrimination. It is not within its
power to so conduct itself that the plain terms of the statute
will amount to nothing. The unintentional act of the carrier
does not estop it from demanding payment of the lawful
charge.
Id. at 829-30.
9. See text accompanying notes 4-5, supra.
10. See text accompanying notes 6-8, supra.
11. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Campbell Soup Co., 455 F.2d
1219, 1221 (8th Cir. 1972).
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adopted the rationale of Fink. The court stated that neither
opinion precluded the consignee from asserting the estoppel defense in all circumstances. The court then adopted a case by
case approach to determine whether the estoppel doctrine would,
on the facts of a particular case, contravene the anti-discrimina12
tion purposes of the Act. Citing cases arising in other circuits,
the court concluded that on the facts of Southern Pacific there
was no contravention of the Act's purposes in allowing the estoppel.
The court's reasoning was inadequate to clarify its view on
when an estoppel defense will lie against a carrier in a suit to
recover freight charges. Although a case by case approach certainly allows maximum flexibility in balancing the public interest embodied in the anti-discrimination provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act against the equities of a consignee, such an
ad hoc approach does little to clarify this aspect of commercial
law. There are several rationales the court could have adopted
in reaching its decision which would have imparted greater certainty and predictability to the area.
One clear rationale for the decision, not specifically adopted
by the court,13 is that the Central Warehouse facts and therefore
its rationale are inapplicable where the consignee has already
paid the consignor. The consignee's argument in Central Warehouse was merely that the carrier was estopped by its mistake in
marking the bill prepaid. The only possible detrimental reliance
to the consignee in Central Warehouse was that he would have
to pay an unexpected freight charge, not a second freight charge
as Campbell would have been required to pay if the estoppel defense had been held inapplicable. Thus the equities more clearly
favored the consignee in Southern Pacific.
A second rationale the court could have adopted is that on
the facts of Southern Pacific the public policy underlying the
12. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F.2d 56
(7th Cir. 1971); Farrell Lines Inc. v. Titan Indus. Corp., 306 F. Supp.
1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 419 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1042 (1970); Missouri Pacific R.R. v. National Milling Co., 276 F.
Supp. 367 (D.N.J. 1967), affd, 409 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1969); Davis v.

Akron Feed & Milling Co., 296 F. 675 (6th Cir. 1924).
13. The court did not specifically note the most obvious difference
between the two fact situations: the consignee in Central Warehouse
had not yet paid any freight, while the consignee in Southern Pacific
would have been subject to a double payment if the estoppel defense
had not been permitted. For a court that did note such a difference
see Missouri Pacific R.R. v. National Milling Co., 276 F. Supp. 367, 372
(D.N.J. 1967).
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anti-discrimination provisions had been satisfied. In Fink and its
progeny, 14 the issue of discrimination in rate making arose in
the context of a mistake by the carrier which led to the consignee receiving an unwarranted preference. Since the statute' 5
does not expressly confine its coverage to intentional rebates or
discounts, these cases found the unintended preferences to be
equally violative of the Act. In Southern Pacific, however, there
was no mistake; the bill was to be prepaid and the consignor
contracted liability for payment. In effect, the carrier extended
credit to the consignor. Because the consignee had already forwarded the shipping charges to the consignor, he neither sought
nor received any preferential rate; the public policy embodied
in the Act was thus never jeopardized since the consignee had
done exactly what was required of him by statute. 10 Further,
had the court held the estoppel defense inapplicable, the consignee would have become an insurer for the credit business of
17
the carrier.
A third basis for distinguishing the instant case from the result in the Fink line of decisions is based upon the theory on
which that case was decided. In Fink, the court was considering
an undercharge situation. The court's decision was based upon
the theory that the consignee could not rely upon the estoppel
defense because as a matter of law the parties are held to know
the publicly listed standard rates.'1 Here, however, the essential knowledge was whether the shipment was prepaid or collect.
This fact is not a matter of public knowledge; in fact, the carrier
who takes the shipment terms from the consignor is in a better position to know these terms than the consignee. It follows
that the consignee should be entitled to rely on the carrier's
representations concerning these terms.' 9 However, it must be
noted that the Southern Pacific court impliedly rejected this
14. See Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d at 1378-83 (1963).
15. See note 3 supra.
16. This argument was accepted by the court in Missouri Pacific
R.R. Co. v. National Milling Co., 276 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.N.J. 1967), a
case with an identical factual pattern to the instant case, and in Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F.2d 56 (7th Cir.
1971).

17. The credit extension argument has been employed in Farrell
Lines Inc. v. Titan Indus. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd,
419 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1969), and in Missouri Pacific R.R. v. National
Milling Co., 276 F. Supp. 367 (D.N.J. 1967).
18. 250 U.S. at 581-82.
19. This theory has been adopted in United States v. Mason &
Dixon Lines, 222 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1955), and Consolidated Freightways
Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1971).
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rationale by failing to overrule the Central Warehouse holding
denying the estoppel defense in the case of a carrier's mistaken
prepayment notation.
Although the court reached the only fair result, the fact that
it did not explicate the rationale of its holding leaves the law
uncertain as to when an estoppel defense will be recognized in
suits by carriers against consignees where the bill of lading has
been mistakenly marked prepaid. Thus, the court postponed
the decision whether lack of payment by the consignee to the
shipper or mistake by the carrier in marking the bill prepaid
was the decisive factor in determining the availability of the
estoppel defense. Thus for the time being, consignees within
the jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit must prepay their bills to
the consignor-and hope that their carrier made no mistake.

Secured Transactions:

Surety's Subrogation Rights Not

A Security Interest Within Article 9 of the U.C.C.
The J. V. Gleason Co. [Gleason] entered into five construction contracts with the State of Minnesota and local governmental units thereof, insuring its performance with both payment and performance bonds purchased from a surety. Each
contract provided for partial payment as the work progressed
with a percentage of the contract price to be withheld until
completion. When Gleason defaulted, the surety completed construction at a cost far in excess of the percentages of the contract prices retained by the project owners. In an action to determine who was entitled to the retained percentages, the district court held that the surety was subrogated to the project
owners' interest in the funds and thus had rights superior to
those of Gleason's trustee in bankruptcy.1 The only issue presented on appeal was whether the lien created by the doctrine
of subrogation was a security interest and thus subject to the
filing requirements of the Minnesota Uniform Commercial Code
[U.C.C.].2

In affirming the judgment of the district court, the

Eighth Circuit held that Article 9 of the U.C.C. was intended to
apply only to "consensual" security agreeements. Because the
surety's interest in the retained percentages arose by operation
1. A trustee in bankruptcy has the status of a lien creditor.
§ 336.9-301 (1971).
2. MIxN. STAT. § 336.9-302 (1971).

MINN. STAT.
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of law independent of any contractual assignment, the filing provisions of Article 9 were not applicable. In re Gleason Co., 452
F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1971).
Under the doctrine of subrogation, a surety on a construction contract who fulfills the obligations of its defaulting principal "stands in the shoes" of three parties: the contractor insofar as there are accounts receivable due it, 3 laborers and materialmen to the extent the surety has satisfied their claims against
the contractor, 4 and the owner of the construction project to the
extent that the owner has retained a percentage of the contract
price to insure completion.5 The surety's accession to the rights
of the creditors of its principal has been said to amount to an
equitable assignment whereby the surety is to be treated "as
though he were an assignee of the creditor . . .entitled to all
priorities and immunities enjoyed by the creditor." Prior to the
adoption of the U.C.C. it was well established in the United
States generally, 7 and in Minnesota specifically,8 that a surety
who had actually completed, or had removed liens against, a construction project was subrogated to the project owner's right
to use any retained percentages to complete construction. The
effect of the subrogation was that the surety obtained rights to
the retained funds superior to any rights of the contractor's creditors because the contractor himself had no right to the funds
until the project owner accepted the construction as completed.
The basic question presented in Gleason was whether the
doctrine of subrogation survived the enactment of the U.C.C.
in Minnesota. 9 The position of the Eighth Circuit, which is in
accord with the almost unanimous authority of other jurisdictions, 0 is based upon a two-step analysis of the U.C.C. First,
3. See National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,
411 F.2d 843, 845 (1st Cir. 1969).
4. See Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962).
5. See, e.g., Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
208 U.S. 404 (1908); Prairie State Nat. Bank v. United States, 164 U.S.
227 (1896).
6. L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SuRETYrvsm § 47 at 206
(1950).
7. See, e.g., cases cited in note 5 supra.
8. See, e.g., First Nat. Bank v. McHasco Elec., Inc., 273 Minn.
407, 141 N.W.2d 491 (1966); National Surety Co. v. Berggren, 126 Minn.
188, 148 N.W. 55 (1914).
9. Although the Eighth Circuit applied Minnesota law, the uniformity envisioned when the Uniform Commercial Code was promulgated makes its interpretation of more than local importance.
10. See Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc.,
427 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying Massachusetts law); National
Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir.
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section 1-103 provides that any existing principle of law or equity
not specifically displaced by the Code is to be read as supplementary to its provisions." The court reasoned that a surety's
subrogation to a project owner's rights survived the Code's
adoption, unless the lien created by the rule is a security interest within the meaning of section 9-102.12
Second, in analyzing section 9-102, the court held that the
section should be read in the light of the official comment to section 9-101,13 which suggests that "[tihe aim of [Article 9] is to
provide a simple and unified structure within which the immense
variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty." Citing an
earlier First Circuit case 14 for the proposition that the "unique
accumulation of subrogation rights serves to induce a function
that is neither ordinary insurance nor ordinary financing,""' the
court concluded that the surety's position was quite different
from "that of the commercial lender, who [was] obviously the
primary target of Article 9," and that therefore there was no
reason to assume that the provisions of the Article were applicable to the suretyship situation.' 6 The court also focused on the
official comment to section 9-102 of the Code, which describes
1969) (applying Massachusetts law); Home Indem. Co. v. United States,
433 F.2d 764 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (applying Illinois law); United States Fidelity

& Guar. Co. v. First State Bank, 208 Kan. 744, 494 P.2d 1149 (1972);
National Surety Corp. v. State Nat. Bank, 454 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1970);

Canter v. Schlager, 267 N.E.2d 492 (Mass. 1971); Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Clark, 254 So. 2d 741 (Miss. 1971); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Perrolta,
62 Misc. 2d 252, 308 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Jacobs v. North-

eastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 (1965).
Several cases are not in keeping with the position of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as expressed in Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp.,
supra, in that they imply that the doctrine of subrogation does not
survive the adoption of the U.C.C. in Pennsylvania. Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Mullett, 295 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Pa. 1969); United States ex rel. Greer
v. G.P. Fleetwood & Co., 165 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Pa. 1958) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. State Public School

Bldg. Authority, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 717 (C.P. of Dauphin County 1961).
11.

MINN.

STAT.

§ 336.1-103 (1971).

12. MINN. STAT. § 336.9-102
13. MINN. STAT. § 336.9-101
14. National Shawmut Bank
843, 845 (1st Cir. 1969).
15. The First Circuit went

(1971).
(1971).

v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d
on to distinguish between the credit

offered by the surety and that offered by a commercial lender by ob-

serving that "while the surety extends its credit to the owner .

. . ,

as

the ultimate guarantee that the job will be done, this is a credit that

may either never have to be drawn upon or, if it is drawn upon at all,
will in all likelihood be overdrawn." 411 F.2d at 845.
16. 352 F.2d at 1122.
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the purpose of the section as that of including "all consensual
security interests in personal property and fixtures" within the
scope of the Code. In light of the comment, the court agreed
with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which had held that
[r]ights of subrogation, although growing out of a contractual
setting... do not depend for their existence on a grant in the
contract, but are created by law to avoid injustice ....1
The court concluded that because rights of subrogation were not
consensual, they were not security interests within the meaning
of Article 9.
It is likely that the question whether a surety's right of subrogation survived the adoption of the U.C.C. has now been completely settled. Although the position which the Eighth Circuit
has adopted has been severely criticized by student commentators,18 the criticism has been directed mainly toward considerations of symmetry. If the purpose of Article 9 of the U.C.C. was
to provide a single "simple and unified structure" for securing
transactions, it would be desirable to include rights arising under
the doctrine of subrogation within that structure. From a more
functional perspective, however, there is no reason to read "security interest" to include a surety's right to subrogation. As
the Eighth Circuit pointed out, 9 the purpose of the filing provisions of Article 9 was to protect creditors who might advance
credit secured by property upon which there were prior liens.
The percentage of the contract price retained by the owner of
a construction project, on the other hand, would not be available to the contractor's general creditors until the contractor
successfully completed the project. Thus, there is no reason to
require the surety to file a financing statement, since it would
have no interest in the retained funds until any interest the contractor's creditors might have had was already cut off by the
20
contractor's default.

17. Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 429, 206 A.2d 55
(1965).
18. See Note, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 582 (1969); Comment, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 927 (1965); Note, 69 Dicm. L. REv. 172 (1965); Note, 4 B.C. IND. &
Com T.REV. 748 (1963).
19. 452 F.2d at 1123.
20. Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. at 422, 429, 206 A.2d 49,
54 (1965).
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Taxation: Estate's Partial Distribution to a Beneficiary
In Advance of Final Decree of Distribution Not an Amount
"Properly Paid" and Not Taxable to the Recipient Since
Subject to Recall
Pursuant to an order of the probate court, plaintiff received
distributions from her husband's estate which were, in effect,
partial advances to her as sole residuary legatee. However, the
advances were subject to recall if needed to pay expenses, debts
or taxes of the estate.' The plaintiff did not report as income
any amount attributable to the advance despite the existence of
distributable net income in the estate for the year. The Com-

missioner assessed a deficiency. Plaintiff paid the amount of the
deficiency and instituted a suit for refund. The district court
found that plaintiff had not realized any income by virtue of the

estate's distributions to her 2 and the government appealed. The
Eighth Circuit held that the advance was not income to plain-

tiff, since the payments were subject to recall by the probate
court to meet other estate obligations and were therefore not

"amounts properly paid" within the meaning of Internal Reve-

nue Code of 1954, Section 662 (a) (2). Bohan v. United States,
456 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1972).3
An estate is allowed a deduction in computing its taxable
income for the year for certain distributions to beneficiaries.
I.R.C. section 661 provides in relevant part:
(a) Deduction.-In any taxable year there shall be allowed as
a deduction in computing the taxable income of an estate ...
(2) any other amounts properly paid4 or credited or required
to be distributed for such taxable year.
Whenever an estate is allowed a deduction under section 661,
that amount is taxed to the recipients pursuant to section 662:
1. Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.613 (1949) provides that on approval of
the probate court, specific personal property may be distributed to a
distributee prior to a decree of final distribution subject to recall by
that court.
2. Bohan v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
3. The Internal Revenue Service has announced its intention not
to follow Bohan and to continue to litigate cases involving substantially similar facts. Rev. Rul. 72-396, 1972 INT. REv. BULL. No. 34, at 26.
4. INT. Rrv. CODE of 1954, § 661(a) [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.].
5. DNI of the estate defines the maximum deduction permitted
the estate and the maximum amount taxed to all beneficiaries as a
group. I.R.C. §§ 661(a), 662(a). Where more than one beneficiary receives a taxable distribution from the estate during the year, and the
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(a) Inclusion.-... [TIhere shall be included in the gross income of a beneficiary to whom an amount specified in section
661(a) is paid, credited, or required to be distributed...
(2) All other amounts properly paid, credited, or required to
be distributed to such beneficiary for the taxable year ...0
Neither the Code nor regulations define an "amount properly paid" by the estate such that the recipient will be taxed
thereon. Most courts that have considered the question have
stated that in order to be deemed "properly paid" the amount
must have been irrevocably and unconditionally distributed to
the beneficiary.7 At least one court, however, has stated that
the requirement means "rightly paid, with legal justification."s
In either case, state law and the terms of the will are relevant
factors in determining whether an amount has been properly
paid.9
total of all such distributions exceeds the estate's DNI. the DNI is apportioned among the recipients to determine the amount taxable to
each. LR.C. § 662(a) (2). Since plaintiff was the sole recipient of distributions from the estate during 1957 and those distributions exceeded
the estate's DNI for that year, if any amount is taxable to her, it is an
amount equal to the estate's DNIL
6. LR.C. § 662(a). While, under state law, the distributions to
plaintiff were made from corpus, any distribution within the terms of
Section 662(a) (2) is conclusively presumed to be one from DNI to the
extent thereof. 6 J. MERTENs, LAw OF FEDERAL INcoMdE TAXATION § 36.72
(1967) [hereinafter cited as MERTENs].
7. See Frank's Trust of 1931 v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 992 (3d
Cir. 1948); Lynchburg Trust & Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d
356 (4th Cir. 1934); Commissioner v. Stearns, 65 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1933);
Hay v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Tex. 1967); Grant v. Nicholas, 127 F. Supp. 236 (D. Colo. 1955).
8. Proctor v. White, 28 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Mass. 1939). See
also Estate of Robert W. Harwood, 3 T.C. 1104 (1944).
9. Estate of Robert W. Harwood, 3 T.C. 1104 (1944); Rev. Rul.
71-335, 1971-2 CuzL BuLL. 250. See also United States v. Bank of
America, 326 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1963).
Reliance on state law and the terms of the will is justified in that
the meaning of "required to be distributed currently," as used in Sections 661(a) (1) and 662(a) (1), is the same as the definition of that language for purposes of Section 652 (relating to taxation of trusts which
are required to distribute all income currently, and their beneficiaries).
Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(b) (1960). Regulations to Section 651 indicate
that the determination of whether trust income is required to be distributed currently depends upon the terms of the trust instrument and
the applicable local law. Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-2(a) (1960). Since Sections 661 (a) (1) and (a) (2) and Sections 662 (a) (1) and (a) (2) are respectively in pari materia, it is appropriate to consult state law and the
terms of the will to determine under Sections 661(a) (2) and 662(a) (2)
whether amounts are "required to be distributed." Arguably, it follows
that resort to state law and the terms of the will should be made in a
determination of "properly paid or credited," terms which are also in
Sections 661 (a) (2) and 662 (a) (2) as coequal and closely related to "required to be distributed."
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Bohan is the first decision to hold that a conditional advance
distribution is not an amount properly paid because a court may
require it to be returned to meet estate obligations. The Eighth
Circuit summarily approved the district court's reasoning that
since the distribution was subject to recall it was not irrevocably
and unconditionally placed at the disposal of the beneficiary,
and hence was not "properly paid."' 0 Many of the cases cited
by the district court as supporting this standard turned on
whether a credit to the account of a beneficiary gave him rights
sufficiently extensive to tax him on the amount of the funds
so credited." In the situation presented by those cases, it was
necessary to determine if the beneficiary had such economic use
and benefit of the funds that it would be equitable to tax him.
Since some person or entity had to be taxed on the estate's income, the question was who had control of the fund against
12
which the tax was to be charged.
The above cases suggest several reasons why Bohan should
have been decided in favor of the Commissioner. First, if control of the fund is the dispositive consideration, then when an
estate actually distributes funds, the beneficiary has the use and
benefit thereof so that it is appropriate for him to bear the burden of the tax. Second, and necessarily tied to the first, since
the beneficiary has control over the distributed funds in fact,
even though legally he may have to return them at some later
date, he has a source for the payment of the tax. Third, the assertion that since the distributions are subject to recall the funds
are not really within the control of the recipient is not justified
by the realities of estate administration. When the time has
passed for estate creditors to file claims, the debts, expenses
and taxes of the estate can be reliably estimated, and the amount
that can be distributed safely in advance of final settlement can
be determined easily.' 3 Seldom will an executor make a distribution unless the possibility that the amounts so paid will be
recalled is remote, since in most jurisdictions if an executor
makes partial distributions in advance of final approval of his
accounts, he becomes personally liable if the funds he retains
10. 456 F.2d at 852. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
11. Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1966); Lynchburg
Trust & Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1934);
Commissioner v. Stearns, 65 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1933); Grant v. Nicholas,
127 F. Supp. 236 (D.Colo. 1955).

12. See cases cited in note 11 supra. See also C.R. Hubbard Es-

tate, 41 B.T.A. 628 (1940).

13. See generally Weed's Estate v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 149
(E.D. Tex. 1952); Estate of Robert W. Harwood, 3 T.C. 1104 (1944).
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prove insufficient to meet the estate's obligations.' 4 Recall is
even less likely when partial payments must be approved by a
court before being made' 5 or are in fact approved after payment.' 6 In addition, there is no indication that when beneficiaries receive partial estate distributions they do not exercise
the normal incidents of ownership for fear of being required to
return some part or all of such amount. Therefore, while an
intermediate payment of a bequest or legacy may not be legally
conclusive of the rights to such funds, there is no reason for the
tax law to ignore the realities and cause tax results to vary because of remote contingencies.
The government further asserted on appeal that the amounts
received by plaintiff from the estate were properly paid under
section 662, and hence includible by her as income, because received under a claim of right. 1'7 The court properly rejected
the direct application of the doctrine as unwarranted by the
facts since the taxpayer did not assert a superior right but instead acknowledged a possibility of recall by the estate.1 8 The
court further noted that the claim of right invocation
is merely a bootstrap argument by which the Government assumes the conclusion which is at issue here-namely, whether
the distributions to the taxpayer were taxable to her as income.
Where [the] conditions [of Section 622(a) (2)] are not met,
the distributions are not taxable as income; and the "claim of
right" doctrine does not convert that which is not income into
income.19
14. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.613(2) (1949). See generally
Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1966); Estate of Robert W.
Harwood, 3 T.C. 1104 (1944).

See also A.J. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 167

(Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as CASNER].
15. A probate court in Missouri must approve any partial distributions prior to their payment. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 473.613 (1949). In Bohan,
such an approval was obtained by plaintiff acting in her capacity as
executrix. Bohan v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 1356, 1357 (W.D. Mo.
1971).
16. See Proctor v. White, 28 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1939). In
Estate of Robert W. Harwood, 3 T.C. 1104 (1944), court approval of
the executor's accounts or "the probability of such approval" was
deemed a relevant factor in determining whether intermediate distributions were properly paid. Id. at 1107.
17. 456 F.2d at 852-53. The court considered the contention on
its merits, even though it was not argued in the district court. Id.
18. 456 F.2d at 853. For the rule to apply, the taxpayer must
have received income to which he asserts a claim of right superior to
the rights of any other person, and without restriction as to its disposition, although his right to retain such income is disputed and he may
subsequently have to return it. North American Oil v. Burnet, 286
U.S. 417 (1932). However, the claim of right doctrine, in application,
has not always required the presence of all the theoretical elements.
2 AMrTs, supra note 6, § 12.103 at 420-21.

19.

456 F.2d at 853.

The court further noted that the claim of
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However, as a practical matter, there would appear to be
no reason for treating the beneficiary of an advance distribution
any differently than a taxpayer subject to the claim of right
doctrine. As noted above, 20 when all the parties conduct themselves as if the partial distribution gave the recipient absolute
ownership of the funds paid, and the possibility of recall is negligible, 21 it is proper that the beneficiary be required to pay an
appropriate income tax with regard to the distribution. Then,
if at some subsequent time repayment of the distributed sums
is required, a readjustment of taxable income between the bene22
ficiary and the estate for the prior tax year can be effected.
One author has noted that if Bohan prevails, then:
In view of the fact that partial estate distributions in all states
would be subject to recall if in excess of what the distributee
is ultimately entitled to, the result of this case . . . would appear to force taxability of estate income
2 3 to the estate until a
definitive final distribution can be made.
Prior to the year of termination of the estate, the partial distribution will not be deemed "properly paid" to the beneficiary
because of the contingent claims of the estate. Therefore, the
amount taxed to the beneficiary will not be determined by the
amount of DNI in any year other than the estate's final tax
year, and no tax consequences will arise until that year. Since
the amount of a distribution taxed to a beneficiary is limited
by the DNI of the estate's distribution year, these tax consequences can be minimized by minimizing DNI in the final year,
either by deliberate timing of income items and deductions or
by use of a short final year.
Thus, Bohan introduces new possibilities for tax manipulation. Because of these possibilities the IRS has refused to acquiesce in Bohan and will continue to litigate in similar fact sit24
uations.

right doctrine:
is used to determine when income is taxable rather than
whether a receipt is taxable income, and if so, to whom it is
taxable.
Id. See generally 2 MERTENS, supra note 6, § 12.103.
20. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
21. Cf. Estate of Robert W. Harwood, 3 T.C. 1104 (1944).
22. Professor Casner considers this the sounder view "in light of
the structure of the Code." CASNER, supra note 14, at 167. Where the
claim of right doctrine applies, the adjustment is accomplished under
the procedures of I.R.C. § 1341.
23. CAsNER, supra note 14, at 167.

24. See note 3 supra.
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Taxation: Loss Deduction Disallowed Where
Demolition Permitted in Lease
Plaintiff-taxpayer attempted to lease property to a municipal parking authority for a monthly rental of $500, but the negotiations broke down when she refused to agree to demolition
of a building on the property. Subsequently, the property was
leased to a bank for a monthly rental of $750 with a clause permitting the lessee to demolish the building. The bank exercised the right to demolish and subsequently made improvements
which, under the terms of the lease, were to become the property of the lessor upon termination of the lease. Plaintiff sought
a loss deduction for the adjusted basis of the building in the year
of demolition and sued for a refund after paying the full tax
when the IRS denied the loss. In reversing the district court,
the Eighth Circuit held that where the demolition is "wanted,
needed, or called for" in the lease, and particularly where a portion of the rent is apparently intended to compensate the lessor
for such demolition, no loss deduction is allowed. Foltz v. United
States,458 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1972).
Section 165(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows
a deduction for "any loss sustained during the taxable year and
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise." A regulation
proposed initially under this section disallowed the deduction in
cases of demolition of structures "pursuant to the terms of a
lease."' As finally promulgated, however, Treasury Regulation
section 1.165-3(b) (2) disallowed the deduction only in cases
where the demolition occurred "pursuant to the requirements of
a lease or the requirements of an agreement which resulted in a
lease. ' 2 The predictable result of this wording was that taxpayers invariably used permissive demolition clauses and claimed
the deduction by arguing that the demolition was not pursuant
to the "requirements" of the lease.
One of the first cases to test such a clause was Feldman v.
Wood.3 There the buildings were demolished several years
after the commencement of the lease term pursuant to a clause
in the lease which gave the lessee the right to do so. In allowing
the deduction, the court reasoned that since the property de1. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.165(3) (d), 24 Fed. Reg. 8177, 8180
(1959).

2. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (b) (2).
3.

335 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1964).
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molished had been used by the taxpayer either in his trade or
business or for the production of income, the destruction necessarily resulted in a deductible loss. Moreover, the court suggested, the taxpayer had complied with the language of the Commissioner's own regulation so he was entitled to the deduction.
Despite the language of the regulation, however, the Commissioner continued to contest such loss deductions.
In Holder v. United States,4 however, the Fifth Circuit disallowed a similar deduction claimed by the taxpayer. In Holder,
the parties stipulated that at the time of the execution of the
lease the lessee had no definite plans to demolish the buildings.
Moreover, the terms of the lease were permissive as to demolition, rather than mandatory. On the other hand, the lease provided that if the lessee exercised his right to demolish the existing structure, it would have to erect a replacement meeting certain specifications. The court reasoned that since the lease provided a compensatory quid pro quo for demolition, the taxpayer
suffered no loss under section 165. It was therefore unnecessary, the court said, to discuss either Feldman or the language
of the regulation. The Fifth Circuit later allowed the deduction
in a case where the lessor was not clearly compensated for the
loss of the building.5
Finally, in Landerman v. Commissioner," the Seventh Circuit disallowed a deduction where the building was destroyed
pursuant to a permissive clause. The court attempted to avoid
Feldman by construing the word "requirements" in the regulation to mean "wanted, needed, or called for," thus bringing the
situation within the prohibition of the regulation. This interpretation probably was not intended by the draftsmen since the
regulation as originally proposed had been amended to include
the word "requirements." More persuasively, the court reasoned
that the dispositive question regarding deductibility is not
whether the clause is mandatory or permissive, but, rather,
whether the parties intended to raze the existing structure at the
time the lease was signed. Since the lower court had found that
demolition was an underlying condition of the lease, 7 the court
concluded that the deduction should be disallowed.
In a sense, Foltz presented a more difficult case than had
been encountered in the earlier decisions. Unlike Holder, the
lease ostensibly provided the lessor no additional benefits in the
4.
5.
6.
7.

444 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1971).
Hightower v. United States, 463 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1972).
454 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1971).
54 T.C. 1042 (1970).
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Moreover, the trial court had found that
intended or contemplated that the office

building would necessarily be demolished," and thus the court
could not use the Landerman reasoning that a loss is inappropriate where demolition is an underlying condition of the lease.
Nevertheless, the court disallowed the deduction. It relied
initially on the Landerman argument that Treasury Regulation
section 1.165-3(b) (2) disallowed the deduction where the demolition was merely "wanted, needed, or called for" in the lease.
More realistically, however, it denied the deduction because the
general statutory prerequisite of an uncompensated loss had
not been proved. This conclusion was supported, in the court's
view, by the fact that whereas the taxpayer had refused to include a demolition clause with rentals of $500 per month, she
had agreed to such a clause in a lease requiring monthly rentals
of $750. This increase in rent, the court concluded, represented
compensation for the possibility of demolition. In this respect,
the court's analysis was similar to that of the Holder court, except that the compensation for demolition to the Foltz lessor was
not explicitly denominated as such in the lease, but was instead inferred from the circumstances by the court.
Analytically, at least, the deduction should have been disallowed in all of these cases. Despite the contrary inference
that arises from the use of the word "requirements" in Treasury
Regulation section 1.165-3(b) (2), the question is not whether
the demolition was required or merely permitted by the lease.
Rather, the dispositive consideration is whether the parties intended to permit or require the demolition during the tenancy.
If so, the lessor was presumably compensated, by higher rentals,
by the right to improvements at the termination of the lease,
or otherwise. In such a situation, no loss has been suffered.
Where, on the other hand, demolition is not contemplated at the
time of the execution of the lease, an immediate deduction of
the undepreciated value of the building is appropriate. In such
case, no benefit to the lessor stipulated in the lease is attributable to the lessor's relinquishment of his right to receive the
building at the end of the term. Thus the demolition is uncompensated and a loss deduction is proper.
Authority for this analysis is found in Treasury Regulations
sections 1.165-3 (a) and (b). Under Treasury Regulation section
1.165-3 (a) (1), if the purchase of realty in the course of a trade
or business or for profit is made with the intention of demolishing existing structures, no deduction is allowed on account
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of the demolition, and the entire basis of the property is allocated to the land, except that some basis may be allocated to
buildings which will be used prior to demolition. On the other
hand, the adjusted basis of property demolished pursuant to a
plan formed subsequent to the acquisition of the building is allowed as a loss. By analogy, therefore, the intention to demolish
at the time of the execution of a lease should be dispositive of
the question whether a loss deduction is allowable to a lessor
under section 165 (a).
Furthermore, if this analysis represents a proper resolution
of the question, then Treasury Regulation section 1.165-3 (b) (2)
need not be read as conclusively authorizing a deduction where
the demolition was not strictly required by the terms of the lease,
despite the expressio unius, exclusio alterius interpretation of
the regulation given by the Feldman court. 8 That is, since section 1.165-3 (b) (1) allows the deduction when the plan of demolition is formed subsequent to the acquisition, section 1.165-3 (b) (2)
need not be read to allow the deduction where, although the lease
is merely permissive in terms, the actual decision to permit the
demolition occurs prior to the execution thereof. Under this interpretation, the deduction is disallowed both in cases where the
lease specifically requires demolition and in other cases where
the intention to permit demolition existed prior to the transfer
of the property. Although this interpretation of the regulations
is far from obvious, it is less tortured than the Landerman construction of the word "requirements" 9 and more consistent with
the statutory requirement of an uncompensated loss.
To obviate further problems in this area the Commissioner
has proposed to clarify the existing regulation by amending it to
deny the deduction where a building demolition is "required or
permitted by a lease or by an agreement which resulted in a
lease."' 0 Since regulations are upheld unless unreasonable or
plainly inconsistent with the statute, the amendment would appear to be not only valid but dispositive of the issue. Nevertheless, promulgation of the amendment would not obviate the need
for a resolution of the conflict among the Circuits by the Supreme Court, since even if the regulation is limited to prospective effectiveness, taxpayers can reasonably argue that reliance
on the preclarification wording requires that their claimed deductions be allowed.
8. See text following note 3 supra.
9. See text following note 6 supra.
10. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b) (2), 37 Fed. Reg. 7891 (1972).

